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ABSTRACT 
ASPECTS OF EXPERIENCES: THE ROLE OF NOVELTY IN 
RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY ASSESSMENTS 
by Rajesh Bhargave 
Gal Zauberman, Advisor 
 
Many consumption episodes involve experiences that extend over time or comprise 
sequences of outcomes. Whether leisure activities, shopping visits, or service encounters, 
extended experiences vary in their novelty for consumers. While past work has studied 
the role of novelty in how episodes are experienced, in this dissertation I ask: How does 
the novelty of an experience impact its retrospective, overall evaluation? Previous 
research on the snapshot model observed that overall evaluations are based on only the 
most accessible snapshots of experiences. This past work largely focused on accessibility 
differences arising from serial positioning and intensity, whereas novelty stems from 
differences on stimulus or conceptual characteristics. In this dissertation, while 
demonstrating that novelty influences accessibility in overall evaluations, I also show that 
novelty’s effect depends on the timing and type of evaluation. As a basic effect, I find 
that novelty enhances the accessibility of affective experience: Aspects that are normally 
under-weighted in overall evaluations have a larger influence if these aspects are novel. 
Further, studying overall evaluations of affect at different points in time, I find that 
aspects that regularly influence immediate evaluations are more likely to impact delayed 
evaluations if these aspects are novel. Examining different evaluation types, I show that 
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novelty has opposite effects for informational evaluations: Retrospective judgments of 
attribute quality levels are more accurate when an experience is common versus when it 
is unique—an effect driven by learning advantages that accrue through accumulated 
experience. Finally, I distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity by showing that novelty 
varies based on the number of past direct experiences but not indirect experiences (e.g., 
verbal descriptions of episodes) in a domain. Taken together, these findings augment our 
understanding of overall evaluations and explicate novelty. This dissertation also unites 
the snapshot model literature with other work on memory, learning, and affect. 
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I. Introduction 
An inquisitive visitor touring the marketplace would find people engrossed in extended 
experiences: An art collector appreciates a series of paintings at a gallery, a crowd 
gathers to watch a percussion concert on the street, and new parents browse through 
several baby items at a specialty store. The outsider’s visit to the marketplace comes from 
a cross-sectional angle, viewing each person seemingly paired with one experience. In 
contrast, for the consumers being observed, their current experience is one of many 
consumption episodes that they have engaged in. The experience may be a regular 
activity, or it may be novel—perceived as unlike anything ever ventured. Memories of 
past episodes may strengthen their understanding of the present, or they may interfere, 
ultimately influencing how the experience is evaluated retrospectively. This dissertation 
addresses these issues in consumers’ evaluations of extended experiences.  
 
Consumption episodes of many types, including leisure activities, shopping visits, and 
service encounters, regularly extend over time or comprise sequences of outcomes. 
Consumers experience affective reactions and learn attribute information during these 
episodes. For instance, when visiting an art gallery a consumer would enjoy each painting 
at different levels, and he would learn about the artists who created these paintings. As I 
argue in this dissertation, memory for such an extended experience will depend on its 
novelty. In this dissertation, I control for the effect of novelty on how episodes are 
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experienced and attended to as they unfold, and I focus on the effect of novelty on how 
episodes are evaluated retrospectively. 
 
Novelty can be a powerful motivator for consumers as they seek out or avoid novel 
experiences. Novelty also varies across episodes and over time through consumers’ trial 
of new offerings and accumulation of experiences. I draw on both the psychology and 
consumer behavior literature in defining novelty: The novelty of an experience inversely 
relates to the number of prior, relevant experiences and the similarity of those past 
experiences to the focal experience. I study novelty as a source of memorial differences, 
investigating episodes that are entirely novel (e.g., when a consumer has never eaten a 
meal from an exotic cuisine) as well as episodes in which only aspects of the episode are 
novel (e.g., when one dish in a meal is considered exotic). Importantly, I distinguish 
novelty from related constructs, such as affective intensity and unfamiliarity, 
demonstrating how they yield different outcomes on overall evaluations. In sum, one goal 
of this research is to explicate novelty using overall evaluations as a framework. 
 
Further, the present investigation compares global evaluations of experienced affect with 
judgments of attribute quality levels. This distinction has also been addressed in the past 
literature, including work discussing memory for sensory experiences versus memory for 
market information (Shapiro and Spence 2002) and research examining differences 
between hedonic versus informational evaluations of extended experiences (Zauberman, 
Diehl, and Ariely 2006). Conceptually, these characteristics differ in that experienced 
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affect is based on subjective impressions and feeling states, whereas attribute quality 
levels are extracted from external sources. Consequently, the novelty of an experience 
may also have different implications on overall evaluations depending on the type of 
characteristic evaluated. The role of prior experience in memory for attributes has been 
discussed in the literature on consumer learning, whereas this dissertation focuses on how 
novelty influences affective evaluations. Thus, another objective of this research is to 
enhance extant theory on overall evaluations of experienced affect while also linking this 
research stream to that on consumer learning. 
 
Because the present research investigates memories for episodes, an additional factor 
studied is the length of delay between an episode and its overall evaluation. Delayed 
evaluations are of interest in this dissertation, because consumers’ decisions to repeat 
experiences are likewise delayed in many consumption domains. This work underscores 
the importance of delayed judgments, both because they differ from immediate 
judgments and because they are prevalent.  
 
Through five studies, I demonstrate how novelty influences overall evaluations. As a 
basic effect, I find that novelty enhances the accessibility of affective experience: Aspects 
that are normally under-weighted in overall evaluations have a larger influence if these 
aspects are novel. Further, studying overall evaluations of affect at different points in 
time, I find that aspects that regularly influence immediate evaluations are more likely to 
impact delayed evaluations if these aspects are novel. Novel experiences are distinctive 
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even when compared to a broad history of accumulated experiences, leading to 
accessibility advantages that are particularly evident after a delay. This temporal 
interaction suggests that the basis of evaluations may shift systematically over time, 
driven by the experience’s novelty. Examining different evaluation types, I show that 
novelty has opposite effects for informational evaluations: Retrospective judgments of 
attribute quality levels are more accurate when an experience is common versus when it 
is unique—an effect driven by learning advantages that accrue through accumulated 
experience. Finally, I distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity by showing that novelty 
varies based on the number of past direct experiences but not indirect experiences (e.g., 
verbal descriptions of episodes) in a domain.  
 
Before elaborating on these findings, I first turn to a comprehensive literature review, 
which will also illuminate the motivation for this research question and the hypotheses 
tested. I primarily draw on two literatures: the snapshot model in overall evaluations of 
extended experiences, and novelty in memory, learning, and affect. These literature 
streams are disjointed, but they share several features that result in a friendly partnership.  
 
II. The snapshot model literature 
A. Historical sketch and motivation  
 
With increasing attention devoted to the role of affect in decision making and subjective-
well being, many authors studied overall evaluations of extended experiences. This 
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research stream, known as the ‘evaluation-by-moments’ paradigm or ‘snapshot model,’ 
investigated how people remembered the overall pain, unpleasantness, enjoyment, and 
other affective dimensions of experiences that extended over time or comprised 
sequences of outcomes. These evaluations have been labeled as ‘global evaluations’, 
‘overall evaluations’, or ‘remembered affect’ in past work, and they have the common 
characteristics that such assessments are retrospective (i.e., evaluated after the experience 
has concluded) and summarized (i.e., one evaluation for the entire experience). The 
snapshot model is based on the premise that remembered overall affect may not 
correspond to a simple averaging or summing of affective intensity. Instead, a set of 
principles can account for discrepancies between experienced and remembered affect. 
Although the thrust of this research took place from the early 1990s and onwards, the 
body of work was grounded in much older psychology literature, such as Gestalt 
psychology and psychophysical perception.  
 
The interest in retrospective, global evaluations of extended experiences was motivated 
by the heavy reliance on these overall evaluations in judgment and decision making. 
Kahneman et al. (1993) found that people’s choices adhered to remembered affect rather 
than experienced affect when the two forms of affect were in conflict. Specifically, 
participants submerging their hand in ice-cold temperature were more willing to repeat 
the affective experience they judged retrospectively to be less painful than to repeat the 
experience their on-line measures revealed to be less painful. Wirtz et al. (2003) 
replicated this finding in the domain of vacations.  
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Overall evaluations not only are considered in decisions, but also they impact future 
utility streams through remembrance (Elster and Loewenstein 1992). When people 
engage in nostalgia or when they experience painful memories, they rely on distorted 
views of past experiences biased by their later assessments (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1997). 
People derive happiness and meaning by looking back at certain types of past 
experiences, suggesting that utility from remembrance is a significant outcome in its own 
right (Van Boven and Gilovich 2003; Zauberman, Ratner, and Kim 2009).  
 
B. Theory and past findings  
According to the snapshot model, when people evaluate an experience retrospectively 
they do not replay the entire experience like a film. Instead, they retrieve a few key 
characteristics or snapshots of the experience. This snapshot metaphor was borrowed by 
Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) from Kundera’s (1991) fiction novel Immortality. 
Abbreviated memory of experiences often leads to duration neglect, in which the duration 
of an experience minimally influences overall evaluations (see Ariely, Kahneman, and 
Loewenstein 2000 for a review of duration neglect). More generally, this simplified 
representation of a past experience results in people forming overall evaluations based on 
a summary of the experience that may not reflect average of moment-to-moment 
affective intensity.  
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Although past work has consistently portrayed overall evaluations as reflecting limited, 
summary assessments, there is less coherence in the literature in pinpointing the gestalt 
characteristics of experiences that influence overall evaluations. Here ‘gestalt 
characteristics’ refer to the defining features of the whole experience, akin to gestalt in 
form perception (e.g., Koffka 1922). One highly cited, stylized fact from this paradigm is 
the peak-end rule, which states that the peak intensity and end intensity heavily influence 
overall evaluations, and the average of on-line affective intensity provides little 
explanatory power when included in a regression model with the peak and end intensity 
(Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993, Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996). The peak-end rule 
has been replicated in a number of settings, including pain from experimentally-induced 
episodes, medical procedures, and medical conditions (Ariely 1998; Kahneman et al. 
1993; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996; Redelmeier, Katz, and Kahneman 2003; Stone et 
al. 2000), annoyance from unpleasant sounds and television signal impairment (Ariely 
and Loewenstein 2000; Ariely and Zauberman 2000; Hands and Avons 2001; Schreiber 
and Kahneman 2000), satisfaction from service encounters (Verhoef, Antonides, and de 
Hoog 2004), and enjoyment for pleasant film clips, television advertisements, and music 
(Baumgartner, Sujan, and Padgett 1997; Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993; Rozin, Rozin, 
and Goldberg 2004). 
 
While the peak-end rule continued as a subject of inquiry, subsequent work also 
uncovered different determinants of overall evaluations. This research has shown that 
other gestalt characteristics, including the start, local peaks and troughs (Rozin et al. 
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2004), the timing of peaks (Baumgartner et al. 1997), the final trend, the overall trend, 
and the rate of change may also heavily influence overall evaluations (see Schreiber and 
Kahneman 2000 for a list of hypothesized and supported effects). Ariely and Carmon 
(2000) categorize these gestalt characteristics into two broad strokes: “configural aspects 
of the experience” and “transient state at key moments.”  Previous researchers have also 
suggested the possibility of other important moments in experiences. For instance, Ariely 
et al. (2000) conjecture, “that for many experiences, the most important feature may be 
the aspects of the experience that give it meaning.”  
 
Not only have authors proposed different gestalt characteristics as being central to overall 
evaluations, but also empirical evidence reveals that a given gestalt characteristic may not 
always have a privileged status. A number of investigations demonstrated muted effects 
of peak, end, or trend, but these non-significant effects may be explained by differences 
in task characteristics. For example, Rode, Rozin, and Durlach (2007) in investigating 
sequences in meals found no evidence of peak, primacy, or recency effects, though they 
did observe duration neglect. Their muted effect of peak possibly stems from the lack of 
peakedness of the distribution (i.e., kurtosis) of affective intensity. Similarly, Schreiber 
and Kahneman (2000) did not find consistent trend effects, but they varied a number of 
other aspects of the experience which resulted in a less than ideal test of trend.  
 
More importantly, researchers have identified boundary conditions to overall evaluation 
heuristics through theoretically informed moderators. A number of authors discussed the 
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relative weighting of peak versus end intensity. Fredrickson (1991) found that when 
endings were not known, end intensity contributed little to overall evaluations, suggesting 
that the end effect is not fully explained by recency. On the other hand, Carmon and 
Kahneman (1996) and Ariely and Carmon (2000) found that when the end outcome is the 
focus of the experience, such as when experiencing an unpleasant wait in a queue, the 
end is the only important characteristic, and peak intensity does not influence overall 
evaluations. Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) showed that a simple peak-only rule is a 
parsimonious predictor for explaining overall evaluations for unpleasant stimuli, whereas 
the peak-end rule is more appropriate for pleasant stimuli. Finally, Branigan et al. (1997) 
found that when people are expecting to re-experience an aversive episode peak intensity 
alone characterizes overall evaluations. 
 
Additional observations of moderated effects concern other gestalt characteristics, such 
as the trend of the hedonic profile. Ariely and Zauberman (2000, 2003) show that the 
effect of trend on overall evaluations depends on the cohesiveness of the experience, with 
partitioned experiences exhibiting less pronounced or non-existent trend effects. 
Zauberman et al. (2006) find that, holding average intensity constant, improving trends 
are preferred for hedonic evaluations, but declining trends are preferred for informational 
evaluations. Together these moderators help us understand how overall evaluations vary 
across real world experiences that differ on a number of dimensions.  
 
C. Past research related to novelty’s effect on overall evaluations 
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Although novelty has not been the focus of any one investigation in the snapshot model, 
some authors have observed preliminary effects or discussed related constructs. Ariely 
and Carmon (2000) and Ariely (1998) observed a muted effect of peak pain on overall 
evaluations when the focal experience was one of many such encounters with the 
stimulus domain. In their study, participants were long-term patients in a bone marrow 
transplant unit. These patients were asked to report overall evaluations of the pain 
experienced during a medical procedure. Long-term patients tended to provide 
evaluations that were based more on previous experiences and less on their on-line 
ratings of the focal experience. One interpretation of this result is that patients well-
versed with this experience reported overall evaluations that were based on a generalized 
understanding of this type of experience instead of an integration of the focal episode’s 
affect (see Robinson and Clore 2002). 
 
Kemp, Burt, and Furneaux (2008) investigated students’ evaluations of their vacations. 
These authors found that affect experienced during aspects that were most “unusual” 
relative to daily life had a high correlation with overall evaluations. However, this finding 
has a few caveats. The authors did not report the incremental contribution of unusual 
moments in predicting overall evaluations. Instead, they only reported a high correlation 
between affect from unusual moments and overall evaluations of affect. In their study, 
affect derived from different gestalt characteristics of the experience were highly 
correlated and in some cases identified by the same moments. As such, the reported data 
do not distinguish unusual aspects of the vacation from aspects of the vacation that were 
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memorable in other ways. For instance, affect derived from unusual aspects may have 
been near the same level as affect derived from the peak, and potentially an unusual 
aspect could have actually been the peak. Further, because the purpose of a vacation is to 
experience activities that are unlike daily life, unusual aspects may have been more 
influential because they provided more meaning to these experiences and were more 
diagnostic for evaluations (see Frederickson 2000). 
 
Montgomery and Unnava (2009) tested the role of stimulus incongruity in two of their 
studies. In one study involving a written description of a vacation, they found that peak 
intensity or trough intensity only influenced overall evaluations when these aspects were 
unexpected. Aspects were pre-tested for their perceived incongruity using a three-item 
scale measuring how expected activities were relative to participants’ knowledge about 
vacations (“poor example/ good example,” “unrepresentative/ representative,” “atypical/ 
typical”). The focal activities tested featured unexpected elements, such as encountering a 
group of celebrities during an otherwise normal vacation activity. In another study 
involving a sequence of music clips they found that a music clip’s associated affect had a 
larger influence on overall evaluations if it was presented in an incongruous way relative 
to other music clips. While other clips were presented without pauses, the focal, 
incongruous clip was presented with pauses before and after its presentation. Neither of 
Montgomery and Unnava’s (2009) incongruity studies clarifies whether the incongruous 
elements led to enhanced encoding versus other explanations for greater weighting.   
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D. Explanations for the snapshot model 
Why are some aspects weighted more than others in overall evaluations? One explanation 
is that gestalt characteristics could be more memorable and thus more likely to influence 
evaluations. Ariely and Carmon (2000) explain peak effects as emerging from encoding 
advantages. The strong positive relationship between affective intensity and memory 
encoding has been observed in the literature on emotion in memory, helping to explain 
the privileged status of the peak of affect (Gold 1987; Heuer and Reisberg 1990). The end 
of an experience could be more accessible due to its recency, which is a retrieval 
advantage (see Miller and Campbell 1959). Memorial differences could occur for two 
reasons. First, some aspects of the experience may simply be forgotten. According to this 
availability account, people may be unable to encode and retain all of the moments in an 
experience, resulting in their weighting only those elements of the experience available in 
memory. Second, according to an enhanced accessibility account, even if people are 
capable of recalling several aspects of an experience profile, only some of these aspects 
will be accessible at the time of judgment, resulting in their higher weighting in overall 
evaluations (Ariely and Carmon 2000).  
 
An alternative mechanism is that some aspects of the experience provide more meaning 
in the global evaluation task than other moments. Frederickson (2000) states that 
accessibility is not the only explanation for heavier weighting of peak and end intensity. 
Peaks and ends also provide personal meaning. Specifically, peaks convey capacity 
requirements–the maximum of affect one must brace for in anticipation of a re-
13 
 
experience of the episode, and endings convey certainty, providing the opportunity to 
reflect on the experience once it is safely in the past. Ariely and Carmon (2000) explain 
trend effects as emerging from extrapolation, in which the final trend helps to predict the 
intensity of a future re-experience of the episode. Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) argue 
that trend effects could be driven by savoring and dread, adaptation, and loss aversion. 
Together these explanations offer different ways in which these gestalt characteristics 
could be meaningful across a wide range of experiences. Meaning could also be 
idiosyncratic to the episode, the person experiencing the episode, or the judgment 
context. Frederickson (2000) proposed that further research should explore “evaluation 
by meaning” as an addendum to evaluation-by-moments. Ariely, Kahneman, and 
Loewenstein (2000) also mentioned personal meaning as a determinant of why gestalt 
characteristics are important. Further, Ariely and Carmon (2001) and Kemp et al. (2008) 
argue that people’s reasons for their overall evaluations may impact how they form these 
evaluations. 
 
These two sets of explanations can be synthesized with an accessibility-diagnosticity 
perspective on evaluation-by-moments (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Such a frame would 
suggest two determinants of how experiences are evaluated retrospectively: A configural 
aspect or static moment of an experience is weighted in an overall evaluation to the 
extent that it is accessible at the time of the evaluation, and it is deemed diagnostic in the 
specific evaluation task. Particular aspects of the experience are more accessible or 
diagnostic than others, explaining differential weighting of affective moments.  
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E. Unresolved issues in the snapshot model paradigm 
In this dissertation I examine how memorial factors influence overall evaluations, over 
and above diagnosticity effects in these judgments. Nonetheless, exploring diagnosticity 
as a mechanism could be a fruitful area for future inquiry. It is unclear how people judge 
certain aspects to be meaningful to the experience. Do people base their diagnosticity 
judgments on their own goals, do they have lay beliefs about which moments should be 
more meaningful, or do they form such judgments at the time of the evaluation? 
Accessibility and diagnosticity could also interact in overall evaluations. More accessible 
aspects, such as the peak and end, may be treated as more diagnostic even when they do 
not provide additional meaning beyond other moments. Such a relationship is consistent 
with a mere-accessibility framework (Menon and Raghubir 2003). Another possibility is 
that aspects of the experience that are deemed meaningful during the experience are 
encoded better, resulting in their greater accessibility at the time of evaluation.  
 
There are also unresolved issues related to the role of memory in the snapshot model. The 
availability account (i.e., the argument that only some aspects of the experience are 
available in memory, and these aspects constitute gestalt characteristics) has failed to 
receive empirical support thus far. One test of the availability account would be to 
manipulate the encoding of moments through selective attention tasks, as recommended 
by Ariely and Carmon (2000). Presumably moments that are experienced with distraction 
would be less influential in overall evaluations, because they would be unavailable in 
memory. Such a test would be difficult to administer experimentally, since a distraction 
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task would also change the participant’s subjective experience. Although this 
methodology has not been pursued, Kemp et al. (2008) tested recall of affect to examine 
if available moments were more influential in evaluations. Specifically, respondents were 
asked to reconstruct the day-to-day affect they had experienced during an extended 
vacation. Such recall of affect was generally poor, correlating less than 0.3 with on-line 
measures of affect. Even affective intensity of gestalt characteristics, such as peak and 
end, were reconstructed rather than retrieved, yet overall evaluations correlated highly 
with recalled intensity of these gestalt characteristics. Together, these findings suggest 
that even when gestalt characteristics are not more available in memory they are still 
weighted more, contrary to an availability account. 
 
Enhanced accessibility (i.e., enhanced ability to retrieve only some of the available 
aspects of the experience) has been demonstrated as a mechanism driving overall 
evaluations (see Montgomery and Unnava 2009). So far, standard psychological 
measures of accessibility, such as explicit measures of memory or aided recall tests, have 
not yet been administered in the snapshot model literature. For many types of continuous 
experiences the accessibility of specific moments is difficult to measure and instead must 
be inferred based on how different moments are weighted. For instance, people would be 
unable to articulate the specific moments in a continuous sauna session that come to mind 
at the time of a global evaluation. On the other hand, for experiences with discrete 
elements, accessibility can be tested by differential retrieval cues, which would highlight 
particular aspects of the experience at the time of evaluation. While these measures of 
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accessibility can be pursued by future researchers, manipulations of accessibility have 
already been pursued, lending evidence for the enhanced accessibility account. In 
Montgomery and Unnava’s (2009) studies, moments of experiences that were 
manipulated to be more accessible were more influential on overall evaluations. 
 
A next step for the snapshot model literature is studying factors that influence how 
experiences are accessed. Some of the factors studied previously include differences 
across experiences in how they are configured or differences across forms of evaluations. 
The literature can also be advanced by studying changes in how a given type of 
experience is evaluated. In particular, little research has examined how experiences are 
evaluated after a delay, when accessibility is likely to be diminished. While it is 
informative to measure overall evaluations of experiences as soon as episodes have 
concluded, such evaluations are not always formed in real world settings. An overall 
evaluation may instead be formed later when it is useful for a decision. Indeed, past work 
on affective evaluations of objects has found that different factors influence delayed 
evaluations depending on if the evaluation had been formed immediately or only after a 
delay (Novemsky and Ratner 2003; Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2008). Similar results 
may occur in evaluations of extended experiences. 
 
How might delay impact overall evaluations? Delay often implies that the later evaluation 
is in a different setting than the focal experience, resulting in a different set of retrieval 
cues. In the present investigation, I control for the setting in which an evaluation is 
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formed and instead focus on passage of time itself. After a delay there is greater error in 
recalling episodic details. Consequently, overall evaluations may be based on a theory of 
the experience rather than episodic memory (see Robinson and Clore 2002). Apart from a 
general increase in error, error may also be systematically different over time. For 
instance, the end of the experience may not be as accessible after a delay, because the end 
is not that much more recent than other moments. That recency effects diminish with 
delay has been demonstrated by prior research on memory (e.g., Bjork and Whitten 1974, 
Glenberg and Swanson 1986). Montgomery and Unnava (2009), the only empirical 
investigation that compared immediate with delayed overall evaluations of extended 
experiences, also found that the end effect held for immediate but not delayed 
evaluations, consistent with memory research.  
 
Accumulation of experience may be another factor that could change how a given type of 
experience is evaluated. Compared to the totality of life experience, an episode or aspect 
of an episode may be perceived as novel due to its unique stimulus or conceptual 
characteristics. As the experience ceases to be novel, future episodes could be accessed 
differently. Substantively, studying novelty helps marketers predict how accumulated 
experience influences consumers’ evaluations. Because novelty has been shown to drive 
various psychological outcomes, studying novelty would also extend our theoretical 
understanding of how experiences are evaluated. 
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III. Definition of novelty 
Novelty is a rich construct in psychology with a long history. In this section I review 
extant work on novelty and provide my definition of the construct. 
 
A. Definition of novelty in Berlyne (1960) 
The most cited source that discusses novelty is Berlyne (1960). For Berlyne, novelty is 
one of a small set of “collative variables” which he defines as the following: 
…in order to evaluate them it is necessary to examine the similarities and 
differences, compatibilities and incompatibilities between elements—between a 
present stimulus and stimuli that have been experienced previously (novelty and 
change), between one element of a pattern and other elements that accompany it 
(complexity), between simultaneously aroused responses (conflict), between 
stimuli and expectations (surprisingness), or between simultaneously aroused 
expectations (uncertainty). (p. 44) 
 
Berlyne distinguishes “long-term” novelty from “short-term” novelty (p. 19). Long-term 
novelty refers to the stimulus or experience being new relative to the totality of 
experience for the organism. I describe experiences that lack in novelty as being 
‘conventional.’ Short-term novelty refers to the element either being different from other 
elements in the immediate context or different from expectations about that context. In 
this dissertation I focus on long-term novelty, referring to short-term novelty as 
‘incongruity.’ Later, I will compare and contrast these two constructs.  
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 Berlyne recognizes the difficulty in establishing a clear-cut definition of novelty. 
Novelty is not a dichotomous construct, because any stimulus or experience will have 
some connection to previously encountered objects or occurrences. For instance, a 
vacation to an exotic island is still in some ways not novel to the tourist. The tourist may 
have visited beaches near his hometown or sampled food from that island on another 
occasion. More promising is Berlyne’s conceptualization of novelty as a continuous 
variable, defined by three dimensions. Berlyne states: 
…how novel a particular stimulus is will presumably be inversely related to: (1) how 
often patterns that are similar enough to be relevant have been experienced before, (2) 
how recently they have been experienced, and (3) how similar they have been. (p. 22) 
 
Here similarity between the focal stimulus and prior stimuli depends on the degree of 
stimulus generalization. For instance, a cover band’s rendition of a hit song from the 
1980s may not be novel, because prior experiences with the very similar, copied song are 
generalized towards the cover song. In contrast, a new composition from a band that 
specializes in experimental music could be experienced as novel, because the listener is 
unable to relate this experience to any other. Novel elements have an enhanced capacity 
to function as conditioned stimuli, because responses are uncertain and no existing 
responses are generalized to them (p. 69). According to Berlyne, novelty is a relative 
phenomenon: A stimulus is novel relative to a specific class of stimuli. For example, a 
film can be novel relative to other films in terms of its use of visual imagery, plot, or 
other element, even though the idea of depicting a narrative in film is not in and of itself 
novel relative to different genres of entertainment.  
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Berlyne also describes the commonly shared effects of novel elements on subjective 
experience. According to his habituation hypothesis argument, novel elements differ from 
conventional elements in that the organism has become habituated to the latter, and as a 
result the conventional elements have “lost their effects.”  In a related vein, Berlyne 
argues that novel elements induce conflict, whereas conventional elements do not: 
 A novel stimulus is likely to fall midway between two classes that have figured 
in a piece of discrimination learning, so that it will arouse both generalized 
excitation and generalized inhibition of the response, which again means conflict. 
(p. 21)   
 
Summarizing these ideas, Berlyne argues that organisms try to make sense of novel 
elements, but they need not take on such efforts for conventional elements.  
 
B. Other definitions of novelty 
Cognitive psychologists have studied novelty in various tests of arousal, memory, 
categorization, and other outcomes. Novelty is often not explicitly defined in their 
writings, leaving readers to rely on accepted definitions of novelty in common language, 
such as “Something new, not previously experienced, unusual, or unfamiliar” (“Novelty,” 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2009). Yet, these authors’ operationalizations of novelty 
provide an avenue by which to infer how they conceptualized novelty. Later, I will 
describe how novelty has been tested in the Von Restorff paradigm (e.g., Von Restorff 
1933, Hunt 1995) and in other work.  
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The consumer behavior literature also describes the newness of products, conceptualized 
on two levels: incrementally new products and really new products (Alexander, Lynch, 
and Wang 2008; Hoeffler 2003; Moreau, Markman, and Lehmann 2001). This distinction 
relates to the amount of prior knowledge applicable to the product innovation. 
Incrementally new products allow the consumer to import existing knowledge structures 
to understand the innovation, but really new products are more difficult for consumers to 
understand, because these types of products are less related to existing product categories 
(Moreau et al. 2001). Alexander et al. (2008) differentiate really new products (RNPs) 
from incrementally new products (INP) along the following dimensions: 
(1) RNPs enable consumers to do things that cannot be easily done with existing 
ways to solve similar problems, and INPs do not; 
(2) The benefits of consumption are more uncertain for RNPs than for INPs; 
(3) Cost-benefit tradeoffs in utility functions are more uncertain for RNPs than for 
INPs because of consumers’ lack of understanding of attribute-to-benefits links or 
practice in making cost-benefit tradeoffs; and 
(4) Consumers must make greater changes in their own behavior to attain the 
potential benefits of RNPs than to attain the potential benefits of INPs. (p. 308) 
 
Thus, the novelty of a product innovation is based on the level of knowledge for that 
product and relevance of prior product experiences. These concepts have parallels with 
Berlyne’s (1960) definition of novelty, in which a stimulus is novel to the extent that 
other stimulus responses cannot be generalized to it.  
 
C. Novelty as defined in the present investigation 
Below I define the novelty of a consumption experience: 
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How novel a consumption experience is will be inversely related to: (1) how often 
consumption episodes that are similar enough to be relevant have been directly 
experienced before, and (2) how similar the experience is to previously experienced 
episodes. 
 
Whereas Berlyne’s (1960) definition was drafted to encompass behavior for humans as 
well as lower-level organisms, this definition focuses on consumer behavior more 
specifically. As such, I modify Berlyne’s dimensions to emphasize the consumption 
experience context. According to the first dimension, as more similar experiences have 
been accumulated, the experience ceases to be novel to the consumer. I do not include or 
modify Berlyne’s second component on recency (i.e., how recently similar experiences 
have taken place), because that component was relevant for incongruity but less relevant 
for long-term novelty. For instance, if a consumer were to go on two vacations to Hawaii 
separated by five years, the second vacation may still be perceived as less novel despite 
the large temporal gap in experiences. The second dimension described here is based off 
of Berlyne’s third dimension. If one can easily understand a target experience with 
knowledge of other experiences, then the target episode will provide little new 
experiential information. Importantly, novelty stems from stimulus or conceptual 
differences, and not from differences in affective intensity alone. 
 
Both dimensions described above depend on direct experiences rather than exposure to 
information collected from external sources. One might ask: Can people understand new 
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subjective experiences with objective knowledge alone? This question has been tackled 
by phenomenological philosophers (e.g., Husserl 1931), and resolving this issue may help 
delineate humanity’s potential for understanding. While philosophers of science address 
this concern, I have much humbler goals in this dissertation, focusing only on evaluations 
of experiences. Whether knowing about a new experience is akin to actually experiencing 
the episode is questionable, but these different forms of knowledge have been shown to 
feel different to consumers. Indeed, consumers believe that direct experience is 
nonpartisan, and it is more vivid, intentional, and memorable than knowledge acquired 
from external sources (Hoch 2002). Nelson (1970) argues that consumer purchases can 
be differentiated as either search or experience goods. For search goods, information for 
the most important attributes can be acquired prior to purchase, but for experience goods 
most attribute information must be directly experienced to facilitate understanding. The 
present investigation focuses on consumption episodes that can be described as 
experience goods. 
 
The novelty definition articulated above adapts existing definitions in the consumer 
behavior literature. According to Alba and Hutchinson (1987), product familiarity arises 
from “advertising exposures, information search, interactions with salespersons, choice 
and decision making, purchasing, and product usage in various situations.” Moreau et 
al.’s (2001) research on incrementally new versus really new products defines familiarity 
as arising from category knowledge. Thus, in these past investigations concerning 
products, semantic knowledge can make a previously unused product familiar, and 
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novelty is confounded with unfamiliarity. In contrast, in the present investigation only the 
accumulation of direct experiences influences the novelty of that type or similar types of 
experiences. Indirect familiarity with a new experience, such as through exposure to 
advertising, is not predicted to have the same effects as direct experience.  
 
In the definition of novelty put forth in the present investigation, novelty depends on the 
individual: A given experience can be novel to one individual but conventional to 
another. However, in the studies reported here, novelty is not treated as an individual 
difference variable, because such an operationalization may not sufficiently discriminate 
novelty from other constructs, such as expertise. Research on consumer expertise 
indicates that more accumulated experiences is associated with increased expertise, 
which can make it difficult to test the unique effect of accumulated experiences since it is 
often confounded with expertise when the two are measured rather than manipulated 
(Alba and Hutchinson 1987).  
 
One way in which novelty is operationalized in this dissertation is by selecting 
experiences that are prevalent or infrequent across all participants’ natural distributions of 
life experiences. In an alternative test of novelty I also manipulate exposure to 
experiences. Specifically, an experience that is new for all participants is presented as a 
focal episode in a study, and this episode is either preceded or followed by experiences 
like it. Prior exposure results in the focal episode being perceived as less unique both 
during its course and at the time of an overall evaluation. Conversely, subsequent 
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exposure results in the focal episode being perceived as less unique only at the time of a 
later overall evaluation. These exposure manipulations isolate a dimension of novelty, the 
number of direct experiences in the domain, and alter the focal experiences from being 
unique to more common. 
 
IV. Novelty effects on memory 
The intuition that novelty influences memory has existed for millennia. This relationship 
was first encountered in the written record of Western Civilization in the first century 
B.C. in a series of scrolls known as the Ad Herennium in a section on ‘Memoria’ (Wollen 
and Margres 1987). There is considerable evidence for novelty impacting memory 
through different mechanisms, including distinctive processing, involvement, rehearsal, 
and learning. I describe these mechanisms below and explain how they relate to the 
present investigation. 
 
A. Novelty’s effect on distinctive processing: the Von Restorff effect  
Since the advent of experimental psychology, distinctive processing of novel elements 
has been demonstrated in a variety of settings and with empirical regularity. The most 
prominent of these findings is the Von Restorff effect, also known as the isolation effect. 
The eponymous author who discovered this result, Hedwig von Restorff, tested the effect 
of isolating an item in a list on memory for that item (Hunt 1995; Von Restorff 1933). 
She found that after a delay of one day memory for isolated items was superior to 
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memory for decoy items. For instance, in remembering the content of a list that contained 
one digit and nine words, participants were better able to remember the value of the one 
digit than any of the nine words. Though word lists are the most common stimuli 
employed in research on the isolation effect, other domains tested include faces (Brandt 
et al. 2003), narratives (Davidson 2006), and line drawings (Ellis, Detterman, Runcie, 
McCarver and Craig, 1971). The memorial advantage of distinctive elements is evident in 
recognition, free-recall, and cued recall tasks (Worthen 2006).  
 
Since von Restorff’s (1933) classic article, distinctiveness has been the subject of a great 
deal of research activity (for a thorough review, see Hunt and Worthen 2006). A few 
developments have been particularly important. First, greater memory for distinctive 
elements has been demonstrated both for incongruous (i.e., short-term novel) and long-
term novel elements. Schmidt (1991) provides a similar dichotomy, referring to 
incongruity as “primary distinctiveness” and long-term novelty as “secondary 
distinctiveness.” Incongruity effects have been demonstrated by isolating features of 
words from other words in a list, such as through contrasting physical features 
(Kishiyama and Yonelinas 2003) or membership in an incongruous semantic category 
(Geraci and Rajaram 2004). Long-term novelty effects have been demonstrated by testing 
words or combination of letters that are uncommon in the totality of the participant’s life 
experience (e.g., Rajaram 1998).  
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Second, distinctiveness has been shown not to be a property of the isolated element, but 
instead a psychological process that depends on the relationship between the isolated 
element and the other elements. An object that is distinctive in an incongruous context, 
such as a soda can stocked alongside hand soaps, will not be distinctive in a congruous 
context, such as when the soda can is included with other soft drink cans. Similarly, an 
element that is novel in the long-term sense will not be distinctive if it is included in a set 
of other novel elements (Hunt 2006). For an element to be distinctively processed, it must 
be different in the context of similarity. That is, the element must be different from all 
other elements, and the other elements must be similar to each other. This implies that 
long-term novel elements are only distinctively processed if they are included in a set of 
conventional elements (Hunt and Elliot 1980).  
 
Third, past work has demonstrated that the isolation effect occurs due, in part, to 
enhanced retrieval of distinctively processed elements. Novel elements may be retrieved 
better because their features provide diagnostic information that benefits memory 
performance (Hunt and McDaniel 1993). In particular, isolated elements exhibit 
enhanced discriminability from other elements. As well, distinct elements are easier to 
retrieve because they are part of a smaller category set (Bruce and Gaines 1976). In sum, 
the retrieval explanation suggests that novel aspects of experiences will be more 
accessible due to less interference in memory.  
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Fourth, elaborate encoding has been shown to be an additional but not necessary account 
for the isolation effect. The encoding explanation is supported by involvement 
mechanisms described below, such as differences in the orienting response, arousal, and 
processing. However, the isolation effect occurs for incongruous elements even when the 
isolated element is the first one encountered, when it is not evident that this element will 
be distinctive within the set (Hunt 2006). This result suggests that elaborate encoding 
alone cannot explain the isolation effect. Still, encoding is often affected when novelty is 
manipulated. 
 
B. Novelty’s effect on involvement in the experience 
Below, I describe three mechanisms by which novelty has the potential to alter 
involvement in an experience, which in turn may influence how the experience is 
encoded. 
 
1. Mechanism 1: Novelty’s effect on the orienting response 
Organisms are bombarded with an immense set of stimuli and experiences that grab at 
their attention in any natural environment. What will they process? A large stream of 
literature supports the finding that novel elements are more perceptually salient, resulting 
in an orienting response, “a change in posture, in the orientation of sense organs, or in the 
state of sense organs” (Berlyne 1960 p. 79). An orienting preference for novelty has been 
tested extensively with infants, demonstrating that infants gaze at novel patterns more 
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than conventional patterns (Fantz 1964). Adult humans have also shown this effect 
(Berlyne 1971; Berlyne and Ditkofsky 1976) across the auditory (Friedman, Cycowicz, 
and Gaeta 2001), visual (Polich and Comerchero 2003), and somatosensory (Yamaguchi 
and Knight 1991) modalities. Orientation towards novel elements occurs both for 
incongruous (short-term novel) elements as well as elements that are novel in the long-
term sense (Cycowicz and Friedman 2007). Studies of the brain demonstrate that there is 
a particular region associated with this orienting response. These brain studies also show 
that such orientation can occur incidentally and non-consciously (Cycowicz and 
Friedman 1997, 1998, 1999). Further work on rats and other animals demonstrated that 
this result extends across many mammalian species (e.g., Dias and Honey 2002).  
 
The orienting response to novelty has been tied to adaptive mechanisms. For instance, 
Shinskey and Munakata (2005) discuss infants’ orientation to novel patterns: 
“Novelty preferences reflect the efficiency of immature organisms' information 
processing: Once infants have mastered all the information one stimulus offers, 
attending to a new stimulus is an adaptive strategy for acquiring large amounts of 
information in a short time.” 
 
The orienting response research emphasizes perceptual involvement as a mechanism to 
explain differential encoding for novel versus conventional elements (Cycowicz and 
Friedman 1998). Novel elements are more likely to be directly perceived and encoded 
than conventional elements, and as a result their affective value may be more available at 
the time of a memory test. Such an explanation has particular relevance for busy stimuli 
fields in which several inputs need to be encoded, and only some can receive attention. 
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For instance, it is possible that consumers in some contexts will attend to novel aspects of 
experiences but not conventional aspects, which they will not even perceive. However, in 
the studies reported here all participants are explicitly instructed to attend to the 
experience regardless of its novelty. Because people attend to events that are relevant to 
their goals, this type of instruction can equalize orientation towards conventional and 
novel experiences (see Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, and Gilbert 2005). 
 
2. Mechanism 2: Novelty’s effects on arousal 
Berlyne (1960 p. 48) describes arousal as “how wide awake the organism is,” and he 
argues that novelty can enhance arousal. Arousal has a complex history in psychology. 
There are a number of investigators who support arousal as an explanatory variable (e.g., 
Anderson 1990) and others who have abandoned it altogether (e.g., Neiss 1990). Those 
who have researched arousal have distinguished the orienting response from it. The 
orienting response has a direct effect on whether the element is perceived in the first 
place, whereas arousal refers to the subjective experience for the organism, conditional 
on perception. Arousal is intertwined with attention, directing information processing 
(Lynn 1966).  
 
When people have been exposed to an experience on multiple occasions, they become 
habituated to it. According to some prior research, experiences can be less intense—and 
by extension less arousing—as a result of accumulated experience (Bindra 1959; Frijda 
1988; Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Sharpless and Jasper 1956; Stein 1966). 
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Berlyne (1960) argues that more arousing stimuli are also more salient, because they are 
perceived distinctively compared to surrounding stimuli. Thus, higher arousal may 
mediate novelty’s effect on involvement. If novel experiences are more arousing, they 
may be encoded better and be more accessible at the time of later memory tests. 
 
This line of reasoning, linking novelty to greater memorability through higher arousal, 
has two limitations. First, because arousal depends on intensity, this argument assumes 
that novel experiences are more intense—an assumption that is not warranted in many 
comparisons (Berlyne 1960). Novel experiences of one type may not be as intense as 
conventional experiences of another type. For instance, eating Norwegian cuisine may be 
perceived as novel for Mexicans, but Mexicans may find that eating their own, 
conventional cuisine is more intense (perhaps because Mexican food is spicier). As such, 
any comparison between novel and conventional experiences must control for intensity 
differences. It is also unclear whether a given experience will be subjectively more or less 
intense as it becomes less novel over time through accumulated experience. Habituation 
(Stein 1966) or sense-making (Wilson and Gilbert 2003; Wilson, Gilbert, and Centerbar 
2002) could reduce intensity. On the other hand, a conventional experience could feel 
more intense due to the organism having learned a response to it (Berlyne 1960), or 
because greater fluency is experienced with more exposure (Zajonc 1968). For instance, 
the first time a consumer drinks a wine with a subtle flavor he is likely to experience a 
mild reaction to it. Over time, he may learn to appreciate the wine better, and the wine 
tasting experience may be more intense on subsequent occasions. In fact, some of 
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consumers’ very enjoyable and exciting consumption episodes may be those that they 
experience regularly.  
 
Second, arousal has an inconsistent effect on memory for the arousing experience. If 
salience occurs due to enhanced arousal, the effect on memory cannot be anticipated. 
Park (2005) reviewed the literature linking arousal and retention in memory. This 
research demonstrates that for short-term retention intervals low arousal aids in memory, 
but for long-term retention high levels of arousal are beneficial. Additionally, arousal 
does not have a monotonic relationship with memory for information. Earlier writers 
(Berlyne 1950; McDougall 1908) mention that moderate levels of arousal are superior in 
evoking long-term memory effects compared to maximum levels of arousal. This result 
possibly stems from people having an optimal level of arousal. The inverted-U 
relationship known as the Yerkes-Dodson law states that performance is often best at 
moderate levels of arousal (Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Moderate arousal often leads to 
optimal vigilance, which has downstream implications for liking, remembering, and a 
host of other outcomes. Berlyne (1971) discusses two different conflicting processes that 
result in the inverted-U relationship: A primary reward system generates positive affect 
whenever arousal potential increases, but a primary aversion system generates negative 
affect whenever arousal increases past an optimal tipping point (see also Silvia 2005). 
These competing forces result in an experience being processed optimally at moderate 
levels of arousal. 
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Together, these disparate findings on arousal paint a complicated picture of novelty’s 
effect on encoding. As such, I do not champion arousal as a mechanism driving the 
results reported in this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is important to control for arousal 
differences in the present investigation. For instance, novel and conventional experiences 
can be matched on intensity levels by measuring affective intensity. Alternatively, a 
given experience can be rendered less novel through subsequent exposure to similar 
experiences. In this case, the focal episode will be similarly arousing to all participants, 
regardless of the subsequent episodes they experience. 
 
3. Mechanism 3: The Novelty-Encoding Hypothesis 
The novelty-encoding hypothesis also predicts greater salience of novel stimuli. Tulving, 
Habib, and colleagues (Habib 2001; Habib et al.2003; Habib and LePage 2000; Tulving 
and Kroll 1995) identified neurophysiological substrates for novelty assessment. 
According to their model, the brain has a specialized system for identifying novel stimuli. 
The medial temporal lobes assess the degree of novelty for each stimulus by comparing 
the stimulus to information in memory. Based on the relative novelty of stimuli, the 
prefrontal monitoring mechanism differentially weights stimuli to be encoded into 
memory, with novel stimuli receiving higher weights (Tulving and Kroll 1995).  
 
The explanation for novelty-encoding is that stimuli deemed distinctive or novel require 
elaborate processing resources (Brandt, Gardiner, and Macrae 2006). Thus, the novelty 
encoding hypothesis relies on processing involvement as the mechanism for superior 
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recollection of novel stimuli. This explanation is also consistent with Berlyne’s (1960) 
notion that novel stimuli generate conflict. However, because the novelty-encoding 
hypothesis has largely been tested on word lists and simple perceptual stimuli, it may not 
apply as well to stimuli that are intentionally experienced and recalled, as often occurs in 
consumer behavior. Consumers have more volition in the types of consumption 
experiences they undergo, and they may allocate processing resources depending on their 
preferences or goals rather than the novelty of the experience itself.  
 
C. Novelty’s effect on post-experience rehearsal 
After an experience has concluded, thoughts about the episode may continue, and novelty 
may impact such rehearsal of the experience. Wilson, Gilbert, and Centerbar (2002) 
argue that after a novel event occurs, “people automatically engage in cognitive work that 
makes the event seem predictable and explainable.” They refer to this sense-making 
process as “ordinization.” Ordinization implies that experiences encountered regularly are 
less likely to spur further reflection. Berlyne (1960) also argues that novel stimuli are 
associated with conflict and uncertainty, which tend to activate thoughts to resolve them. 
As such, novel experiences lead to more rehearsal than conventional experiences. This 
greater rehearsal could in turn enhance the memorability of novel experiences. 
 
Ordinization suggests a stronger effect of novelty on memory than does the Von Restorff 
effect. Whereas the Von Restorff effect predicts that novel experiences will be more 
accessible given a retrieval cue (e.g., an overall evaluation probe), ordinization predicts 
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that novel experiences will also be more chronically accessible, even without a direct 
memory probe. Wilson et al. (2002) report a study in which they manipulated how 
explainable an experienced romantic interaction was. Later, they measured the 
accessibility of romance-related thoughts with an ostensibly unrelated word completion 
task. Participants for whom the romantic interaction was not ordinized (i.e., if the 
interaction was not explainable) were more likely to complete these words with romance-
related concepts. This finding suggests that a novel experience will engender thoughts 
about the experience that may last well past the end of the experience. The experience 
may still be top of mind at the time of a delayed overall evaluation.  
 
Whether longer rehearsal of novel experiences will actually influence overall evaluations 
depends on the length of delay studied, the intensity of the experience, participants’ 
goals, and other factors that contribute to whether the experience continues to be 
rehearsed. The types of experiences studied in the present investigation may not be 
personally significant enough to stimulate rehearsal over any extended period. As such, I 
do not focus on rehearsal effects in the empirical investigation. Nonetheless, differences 
in rehearsal are important to control for, because novelty may lead to more spontaneous 
immediate construction of overall evaluations through more elaborate rehearsal. This 
possibility will be discussed later.  
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D. Novelty’s effect on learning 
Whereas each of the memory mechanisms described above suggests that novelty 
enhances memory, research on learning finds that lack of prior experience, a dimension 
of novelty, diminishes memory. These seemingly conflicting predictions can be 
reconciled upon closer inspection into the memory processes involved. Because novelty 
often leads to greater involvement, novelty will enhance memorability if the experience 
would not be sufficiently involving otherwise. Because novelty contributes to distinctive 
processing, novelty will enhance memorability if the memory task depends critically on 
accessing an experience in the face of possible interference with other experiences. 
However, because learning is superior with prior experience in a domain, novelty will 
diminish memorability if the memory task depends on accessing detailed attribute 
information.  
 
Why might consumers be better able to remember attribute information for common 
experiences? Through repeated experiences, consumers are exposed to similar attribute 
information on each occasion. In order to make sense of this information, consumers 
develop a cognitive structure for the type of experience as well as domain-specific 
analytical and elaborative skills. Together, repetition, a cognitive structure, and domain-
specific skills tend to enhance memory for attribute information, as revealed by 
differences in novice and expert consumers’ memory (Alba and Hutchinson 1987).  
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Research on consumer learning observes many instances in which prior knowledge or 
familiarity aids in memory for attribute information. Lynch and Srull (1982) provide a 
review of earlier consumer research with this finding. Johnson and Russo (1984) also find 
that familiarity facilitates learning, conditional on sufficient involvement; consumers who 
are highly familiar with a product class may search less, exposing themselves to less new 
information. Kent and Allen (1994) revealed that memory for advertising was superior 
for familiar than unfamiliar brands. Shapiro and Spence (2002) found that simply 
providing consumers with evaluative criteria prior to a product trial aids in their memory 
for attributes. Given that consumers develop such criteria as they repeat a type of 
experience, novel experiences will be associated with poorer recall for their attributes.  
 
Consumption experiences may be evaluated on either encountered attributes, experienced 
affect, or both depending on the choice context. Evaluations of attributes and affect may 
jointly determine many choices, but there may also be conditions in which only one type 
of evaluation governs choice. For example, a restaurant experience may be scored on 
various attributes: variety and quality of menu items, ambience, location, cost, etc. These 
judgments could feed into choices in which various attributes are weighted in a restricted 
context, such as when a consumer needs to visit a restaurant with a quiet ambience and 
higher perceived luxury to conduct a business dinner. Alternatively, consumers may 
evaluate experiences purely on their own affective response. For instance, a consumer 
may decide to go to the restaurant she had the best experience at, independent of its 
attributes.  
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Attribute and affective information vary on at least two dimensions. First, attribute 
information is externally presented, whereas experienced affect is internal to the 
consumer. Internal states are more prominent in consumers’ subjective experience 
(Loewenstein 1996), which may make them more likely to influence choices. Second, 
attribute information is detailed and requires deliberation, but experienced affect is a 
more “global response” (Zajonc 1980 p. 5). Indeed, recent research finds that experiences 
with prior exposure are processed at a lower level of construal than novel experiences 
(Förster 2008). This construal level finding is consistent with research on consumer 
learning, which finds that prior experience aids in processing of detailed (i.e., lower level 
construal) product information. In sum, differences in the type of information may lead to 
asymmetric learning effects: Learning advantages are critical in memory for attribute 
information but less important in memory for affective response, which is relatively easy 
to evaluate retrospectively if the experience is accessible. 
 
There are also boundary conditions to the attribute versus affect distinction in learning. 
Some past research on memory for emotions finds that prior experience in a behavioral 
domain can strengthen learning of experienced affect. Familiarity contributes to the 
development of an enduring affective representation of the experience, which aids in 
organizing experienced affect into memory (Breckler 1994; Breckler and Wiggins 1989, 
1993). When an enduring affective representation is set, people are able to reconstruct 
their affective response based on their memory for attributes, because affect is implied by 
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these attributes. For instance, if one has had much prior experience eating sushi as well as 
stable preferences in this domain, then it would be possible to form an overall evaluation 
of enjoyment of a past sushi sequence by simply recalling the items consumed.  
 
How might learning of affect influence overall evaluations of conventional and novel 
experiences? The relationship between prior experience in a domain and accessibility of 
affect may not be monotonic and may differ by experiential domain. While people can 
easily access affect derived from a unique experience, as they accumulate more 
experiences in the domain any one of these experiences becomes more difficult to access 
due to interference. On the other hand, as people become well-versed with a domain they 
set enduring affective representations which aids in learning of affect. However, only 
when experiences are complex in their affective reactions would affective learning 
advantages off-set memory interference disadvantages that arise from accumulated 
experience. As such, affect from novel experiences should be easier to access than affect 
from conventional experiences, assuming that experienced affect generally does not 
require much deliberation. 
 
V. Novelty and related constructs 
To further explicate novelty, I compare and contrast this construct with related constructs, 
incongruity and unfamiliarity. 
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A. Novelty and incongruity 
Experiences that are novel in the long-term sense may also be incongruous (i.e., novel in 
the short-term sense), either by not fitting the immediately established context or by 
failing to conform to expectations. For instance, after watching a series of cars whiz by 
on the highway, seeing a hovercraft flying along the median will be surprising, because 
such a scene contradicts prior expectations and the immediate context. As well, seeing 
the hovercraft may be novel for those who have never seen such an unusual 
transportation device. However, novelty and incongruity do not always go hand in hand. 
There are many contexts in which a consumer expects novel experiences, such as when 
visiting an area with a starkly different culture. In this context, a conventional experience 
may in fact be incongruous. Novelty can be differentiated from incongruity 
experimentally by providing a sequence of experiences without specified expectations. In 
such cases, experiencing something novel would not be surprising.  
 
Novelty and incongruity not only arise out of different conditions, but also they lead to a 
different portfolio of effects on memory. One shared effect is that both novel and 
incongruous aspects will be isolated in an experience with otherwise familiar or expected 
elements. As a result, both novel and incongruous aspects are more accessible than other 
aspects of experiences (Von Restorff 1933). Encoding effects that arise out of distinctive 
processing apply to both novel and incongruous aspects. However, novel and 
incongruous aspects have different effects on retrieval, which can be revealed by 
comparing recall immediately after an experience versus after a delay. Mechanisms that 
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enhance delayed accessibility for novel aspects, greater rehearsal and enhanced ability to 
discriminate from a wide range of past experiences, do not apply to incongruous aspects. 
In fact, incongruous aspects are often less accessible after a delay, because consumers 
rely on theory-driven memory when recalling experiences from the past (Nunes and 
Novemsky 2008). For instance, when recalling the enjoyment of a meal at a restaurant, 
one might fail to access an element that did not fit expectations, because these 
expectations determine how the experience is remembered. Moreover, whereas the 
amount of accumulated experience—a dimension of novelty—influences learning, 
incongruity has no predicted effect on learning. 
 
B. Novelty and unfamiliarity 
Novelty and unfamiliarity share some commonalities, but they are differentiated in this 
dissertation. The number of relevant episodes previously experienced inversely relates to 
both novelty and unfamiliarity. However, the amount of information collected from 
external sources, such as through exposure to advertising, inversely relates to 
unfamiliarity, but it is not a significant factor in novelty. Finally, the similarity of past 
experiences to the target experience inversely relates to novelty, but it is not a contributor 
to unfamiliarity.  
 
A consumption experience example will help to illustrate these distinctions. Consider a 
consumer planning her first ever wakeboarding excursion. Regardless of how much she 
reads about wakeboarding in magazines or observes wakeboarders on television, her first 
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wakeboarding trip could still be novel to her. When she recounts her wakeboarding 
experience her memory will be relatively untainted by interference with other episodes. 
Her exposure to wakeboarding information through external sources is unlikely to 
interfere with her memory for experienced affect, though such knowledge may contribute 
to her ability to recall information encountered during the wakeboarding trip. Now 
imagine if this first-time wakeboarder has engaged in experiences that are similar to 
wakeboarding, such as surfing, jet-skiing, and body boarding. These accumulated, highly 
similar experiences may diminish the novelty of wakeboarding, influencing remembered 
affect. These dimensions of novelty and unfamiliarity are illustrated in the Venn diagram, 
figure 1 below, for the wakeboarding example.  
 
As described above, there are some factors in novelty and unfamiliarity which do not 
overlap. This conceptualization raises the question: Do the non-shared factors ever spill 
over? First, can knowledge gained through external sources, a factor in unfamiliarity, 
influence memory for affect? Robinson and Clore (2002) argue that people often develop 
a lay theory about an affective experience through knowledge gleamed from external 
sources. These lay theories can color memory for experienced emotions. Thus, even if a 
domain is experienced for the first time one’s recall for affect may be more accurate if the 
experience is associated with no prior knowledge.  
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FIGURE 1 
Figure 1: Comparison of unfamiliarity and novelty for the wakeboarding example 
 
 
 
Although becoming familiar with an experience through external information can 
influence memory for affect for new experiences, this effect is restricted to increases in 
familiarity at the very lowest levels of the familiarity spectrum. One might develop an 
attitude with just a little exposure to the experience concept (see Hermans, de Houwer, 
and Eelen 1994 on automatic evaluation), and each additional exposure to such 
information will not result in greater interference in recalling affect. The attitude could 
become stronger or more nuanced through subsequent acquired knowledge, but the 
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accessibility of the attitude is unlikely to change. Research on attitude activation finds 
that even the weakest and least developed attitudes are activated automatically (Bargh et 
al.1992), suggesting a ceiling effect on how accessible an attitude can become through 
additional knowledge. Whereas accumulation of knowledge does not increase memory 
interference for new experiences, accumulation of direct experience does, either by 
reducing the number of features that provide diagnostic information (Hunt and McDaniel 
1993), or by increasing the category set, which makes the retrieval task more difficult 
(Bruce and Gaines 1976). Importantly, direct experiences are treated and likely 
categorized differently from exposure to information (see Hoch 2002), particularly for 
new experience goods (see Nelson 1970).  
 
The second potential source of spillover is if a dimension attributed only to novelty can 
actually determine unfamiliarity as well. Specifically, can having accumulated 
experiences of a similar type make the focal experience familiar, leading to consumption 
knowledge, expertise, and improved task performance? Because defining the 
unfamiliarity-familiarity dimension is not the goal of this dissertation, I defer to the 
existing marketing literature in answering this question. In the Venn diagram depicted 
above, I take previous conceptualization of unfamiliarity as a given. The past research 
largely studied familiarity with products, where familiarity with the specific brand, 
product, or product category was the focal interest (e.g., Alba and Hutchinson 1987; 
Bettman and Park 1980; Park and Lessig 1981). As such, experience in other, similar 
product categories was not identified as a source of familiarity. Nonetheless, these 
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authors also documented the potential for complexity in defining the relevant product 
category, due to different categorization processes at play, including simple classification 
and concept formation (see Alba and Hutchinson 1987). Variation in how experiences are 
categorized implies that the degree of similarity to other experiences can determine 
familiarity, which in turn influences the development of expertise. Indeed, other work 
finds that knowledge from one class of product experiences can be transferred to another, 
similar class (Gregan-Paxton and John 1997). Although these possibilities are intriguing, 
I do not take charge of defining unfamiliarity and consequently do not explore this 
extension in the present investigation.     
 
A final point on nomenclature will help to unify this dissertation with psychological 
research on novelty. In the psychological literature, novelty and familiarity are drawn as 
endpoints of a continuum, implying that novelty and unfamiliarity are the same 
constructs (e.g., in research on the Von Restorff effect). This word choice was in part a 
result of the stimuli employed. Because most of the research on the Von Restorff effect 
involved recall for words, direct versus indirect experience was not a relevant distinction 
in describing accumulated experiences. However, that distinction is potentially important 
in recall for affective experiences, as elaborated upon earlier.  
 
VI. Hypotheses 
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Building off of the literature review, I predict how novelty will influence overall 
evaluations of extended experiences.  
 
A. Basic effect of novelty 
As described previously, encoding and retrieval mechanisms in the isolation effect result 
in enhanced accessibility for novel elements. Yet, novelty’s effect has not been tested in 
overall evaluations of extended experiences. Drawing from the isolation effect research, 
one straightforward prediction is that novel aspects of experiences are more likely to be 
accessed and thus more likely to influence overall evaluations of experienced affect. This 
effect would be evident in experiences that include a mix of conventional and novel 
aspects, in which distinctive processing occurs. If all of the elements of an experience are 
novel, then no one aspect is relatively more accessible due to its novelty. 
 
This prediction does not yet specify whether novel aspects of experiences are more 
accessible due to more elaborate encoding or enhanced retrieval. This basic result would 
also not reveal how novelty differs in its effect compared to other contributors to 
enhanced accessibility, such as affective intensity. However, I argue that novelty and 
intensity are separable factors, which suggests that even aspects of experiences that are 
mild in their intensity but which are merely novel will be weighted in overall evaluations. 
As well, novel aspects may influence overall evaluations when they are not at the end, 
whereas conventional aspects are less likely to impact overall evaluations when they are 
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not the peak or end. Thus, my first hypothesis concerning the basic effect of novelty on 
overall evaluations is as follows: 
 
H1: When aspects within an experience differ in their novelty, novel aspects are 
more likely to influence overall evaluations than conventional aspects, even when 
these aspects are not the peak or end of the experience.  
 
B. Novelty’s effect on delayed overall evaluations 
There are several instances in which conventional and novel aspects of experiences 
similarly influence overall evaluations. Importantly, these similarities occur only for 
immediate overall evaluations—those evaluations measured immediately after the 
experience has concluded. For instance, regardless of their novelty, the peak and end 
elements of an extended experience will be heavily weighted in such overall evaluations. 
Moreover, whether an entire experience is conventional or novel, immediate overall 
evaluations will be based on similar weighting rules, such as higher weighting of peak 
intensity, end intensity, and trend.  
 
On the other hand, novelty can lead to further differences for delayed overall evaluations, 
which are driven by changes in memory interference as time elapses. Right after an 
episode has concluded interference occurs only between aspects of this focal episode, 
resulting in greater weighting of elements that are more accessible, such as peak and end 
intensity. Immediately after an episode there is little potential for interference between 
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the focal episode and other episodes. For instance, having just eaten a meal at a 
restaurant, a consumer would be capable of uniquely accessing the episode even if he has 
visited the restaurant previously. However, when the experience is accessed after a delay, 
not only may interference between aspects of the focal episode occur, but also other 
accumulated experiences interfere.   
 
Because the pool of potential sources of interference expands over time to include similar 
experiences, conventional experiences or aspects of experiences are likely to exhibit 
diminished accessibility after a delay. As these conventional experiences become harder 
to retrieve, delayed overall evaluations will display more error. In contrast, as a 
byproduct of uniqueness, novel experiences or aspects of experiences will continue to be 
accessible over time. As such, aspects of experiences that influence immediate overall 
evaluations will be more enduring in their influence if these aspects are novel versus if 
these aspects are conventional. Additionally, overall evaluations are likely to be more 
accurate, reflecting experienced affect, if an experience is unique versus if the experience 
is common. These predictions are formally stated below:  
 
H2a: Aspects of extended experiences that influence immediate overall 
evaluations—peak intensity and end intensity—will continue to influence delayed 
overall evaluations if these aspects are novel. If these aspects are conventional, 
they will diminish in their influence for delayed overall evaluations. 
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H2b: Delayed overall evaluations will be more accurate, reflecting on-line affect, 
if the experience is unique versus if the experience is common. 
 
This set of predictions helps to distinguish novelty from related constructs, including 
affective intensity and incongruity. Neither intensity nor incongruity is expected to 
contribute to enhanced accessibility for delayed overall evaluations. Moreover, this set of 
predictions clarifies the mechanism involved, implicating retrieval differences and 
interference as contributing to novelty effects. In memory research finding a difference 
between immediate and delayed memory tasks identifies that retrieval and not encoding 
is responsible for the memory phenomenon.  
 
C. Novelty’s effect on informational versus hedonic evaluations 
Novelty is also expected to have different effects on evaluations depending on whether 
experienced affect or attribute quality levels are evaluated retrospectively. Prior 
experience—a factor that inversely relates to novelty—leads to enhanced learning. As a 
result, detailed attribute information becomes more accessible for common than unique 
experiences: Retrospective judgments of attribute quality levels will reflect more error for 
unique compared to common experiences. However, such learning effects have little 
impact on how affective experience is accessed. Hypotheses 2A and 2B stated above 
predict that novelty will enhance accessibility for affective evaluations. Conversely, 
hypothesis 3 predicts that novelty will diminish memory for attribute quality levels: 
 
50 
 
H3: Recall for attribute quality levels will be more accurate if the experience is 
common versus if the experience is unique.  
 
D. Novelty’s effect on accessing indirect versus direct prior experiences 
The definition of novelty put forth in this dissertation centers on the amount of direct 
experience in the domain. This conceptualization implies that when people access novel 
experiences, past indirect experiences—such as verbal descriptions of experiences—will 
not interfere with overall evaluations of experienced affect. In contrast, for conventional 
experiences indirect past experiences may also interfere with overall evaluations, because 
enduring affective representations have already been set. For these conventional 
experiences, verbal descriptions can function as episodes. The following prediction 
distinguishes novelty from unfamiliarity:   
H4: Past indirect experiences in a domain will interfere in recall of affect for 
conventional but not novel experiences. Overall evaluations of novel experiences 
will be less reflective of on-line affect only with the accumulation of direct 
experiences in the domain. 
 
VII. Overview of studies 
I test these hypotheses in five studies involving hedonic experiences. In all studies, I 
disentangle affective intensity from novelty. This approach separates novelty’s effect on 
on-line affect from its effect on overall evaluations. I employ three methods to control for 
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affective intensity: measuring intensity during a repeat of an experience, manipulating 
intensity, and measuring intensity during an experience. Study 1 investigates hypothesis 
1: Using an annoying sound sequence as the focal experience, I test whether the 
beginning of an experience will be more influential on overall evaluations if this aspect is 
novel. This study involves both mild and intense novel sounds, because I argue that 
overall evaluations will be pulled in the direction of novel aspects regardless of their 
intensity. Study 2— also an annoying sounds study—tests hypothesis 2a, examining 
whether the end of an experience will have a more enduring influence on overall 
evaluations if the end is novel. Study 3 tests hypothesis 2b using pleasant images as the 
experienced stimulus. Study 3 reveals whether delayed evaluations are more accurate, 
reflecting on-line affect, if the episode is unique. Study 4 is designed to capture 
differences between overall evaluations of affect and judgments of attribute quality 
levels, testing hypothesis 3 by employing a browsing sequence as the focal experience. 
Finally, Study 5 resolves hypothesis 4, investigating the role of novelty in accessing 
indirect versus direct experiences in a domain.  
 
VIII. Study 1: Manipulating the beginning of annoying 
sounds  
Study 1 is exploratory, testing the basic effect of novelty on overall evaluations, as 
described by hypothesis 1. Prior theory predicts that the beginning intensity of an 
experience is less likely to influence overall evaluations relative to the peak and end 
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intensity. In contrast, I predict that the intensity of a novel beginning will influence 
overall evaluations, but the intensity of a conventional beginning will not. In this study, 
on-line experience was manipulated by including a conventional or novel sound to begin 
a sequence of annoying sounds. Previous snapshot model research has also studied 
annoying sounds for a number of reasons (e.g., Ariely and Zauberman 2000; Schreiber 
and Kahneman 2000). Auditory stimuli can be edited through sound software, and the 
relationship between auditory features, such as pitch, volume, or distortion and affective 
response is established in sensory research. As well, sounds offer the possibility of 
continuously measuring on-line affect. When listened to intently, annoying sounds can 
provide negative affect at every moment of exposure to the stimulus. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants (n=111), undergraduate and graduate 
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental 
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (conventional, novel 
beginning sound) X 2 (mild, intense beginning sound) between-subjects design. 
 
Selection of Sounds. All sounds included in the focal study were pre-tested for 
their perceived intensity and novelty as separate factors. Sixty-one participants who did 
not take part in the focal study were asked to listen to 27 sounds, which were each 
approximately 16 seconds long. Sounds were presented in random order with short labels 
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describing their content. As participants listened to each sound, they were asked to rate 
their on-line affect on a scale including both valences, from “Very unpleasant” to “Very 
pleasant.” Participants reported on-line affect by continuously moving a probe along this 
scale as they listened to the sound. The average position of the probe over the 16-second 
duration provided a measure of the sound’s valence and intensity. Considering these 
measures, six sounds were selected to construct sequences in the focal study. Two sounds 
were universal to all participants in the focal study. These sounds were labeled “A 
mosquito buzzing close by” and “The busy signal for a telephone.” The mosquito sound 
was rated the worst of all sounds. The sounds chosen for the intense beginning conditions 
were “An electric razor being used to shave” (conventional) and “An electric surge 
caused by a voltage spike” (novel), which resembled an electric distortion noise. These 
sounds were rated to be significantly lower than the mid-point of the on-line affect scale, 
indicating that participants found these sounds annoying. The two mild sounds selected 
for the focal task, labeled “A helicopter hovering” (conventional) and “Beluga whales 
communicating through clicking chatter” (novel), were rated to be less unpleasant than 
the intense sounds and below but not significantly different from the mid-point of the 
scale. For the focal study, these mild sounds were edited through sound software to be 
slightly more unpleasant. I increased the volume of these two sounds so that they would 
be experienced as unpleasant and not neutral sounds. 
 
In the pre-test, a measure of novelty was also collected after the on-line affect rating for 
each sound. Perceived novelty was operationalized in terms of a familiarity rating. 
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Participants responded to the question, “How familiar are you with this sound or sounds 
of this type?” using a scale from 1 (“Not at all familiar”) to 7 (“Very familiar”). The 
helicopter and razor sounds were rated as more familiar than the surge and beluga whales 
sounds, and the universal mosquito and busy signal sounds were also rated as more 
familiar than the surge and beluga whales sounds. Thus, this pre-test was conducted to 
identify sounds that differed in their intensity and novelty as separate factors. However, 
the sounds may have been experienced with different levels of intensity in the focal 
study, because the mild sounds were edited to be louder. As well, the focal study 
involved a smaller subset of sounds, and participants’ on-line affect could depend on the 
other sounds they had been exposed to. Consequently, I rely on on-line measures 
collected during the focal study to control for intensity differences by novelty condition. 
 
Procedure and Stimulus. In the focal study, participants listened to a three-sound 
sequence at the beginning of a lab session. Although no cover story was provided, 
participants were exposed to the sounds prior to evaluating a set of audio speakers in a 
shopping task. As such, they may have inferred that their response to the sound would be 
relevant for the subsequent task. The sound sequence was 48 seconds long: Each sound 
was approximately 16 seconds long and there were no breaks between sounds. 
Participants were asked to listen to the sounds through their head phones, and the sounds 
played on a computer program. As they listened, a list of the sound labels was provided. 
Participants listened to one of four sounds to begin the sequence depending on their 
condition: conventional-intense (razor), novel-intense (surge), conventional-mild 
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(helicopter), or novel-mild (beluga whales). The second and third sounds in the sequence 
were mosquito and busy signal for all participants. Unlike the pre-test, in the focal study 
participants did not provide ratings of on-line affect during the sequence itself. See figure 
2 for a schematic depicting study 1. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Figure 2: Schematic depicting study 1. 
 
 
Measures. After listening to the sound sequence, participants were asked to 
provide an overall evaluation of the entire experience. Specifically, they were asked, 
“Looking back at the entire experience, how unpleasant was listening to the sound 
track?” They responded on an unmarked scale by moving a probe to a position on a line 
anchored by “Not at all unpleasant” to “Very unpleasant.” This overall evaluation was 
measured only on a negative valence because all sounds in the sequence had been pre-
tested to be unpleasant, and even the mild sounds were unpleasant in the focal study. A 
scale focused only on aversiveness allowed participants to provide more precise 
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distinctions in overall evaluations. The probe’s singular position on the scale was 
translated to a number from 0 to -100, with lower numbers indicating more overall 
unpleasantness. 
 
At the end of the lab session (M=35 minutes later), after participants completed other 
unrelated studies they responded to a second set of measures. At this second stage, 
participants were asked to report how familiar the individual sounds were to them using 
the same familiarity scale that was employed in the pre-test. Participants then listened to 
the entire sound sequence again, during which they responded to the on-line affect 
measure. For the on-line measure, participants were asked to move a probe continuously 
at every moment on a scale from “Not at all unpleasant” to “Very unpleasant” as they 
listened to the sound. An on-line measure was not taken during the initial experience 
itself, because prior research finds that measuring on-line affect can disrupt subjective 
experience (see Ariely and Zauberman 2000). In particular, on-line measurement tends to 
segment the experience more, reducing the effect of trend on overall evaluations. As well, 
because participants may be engrossed in the experience they may not be able to provide 
accurate concurrent ratings. In this study, a combination of an uninterrupted first play of 
the sequence and a delayed, repeat of the experience with an on-line measure helps to 
eliminate such disruption. The delay between the focal experience and its repeat was 
included to minimize fatigue. This methodology has prior precedent for other temporally-
extended affective experiences, and measuring on-line affect during a delayed, repeated 
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presentation of an experience has been shown to be a useful and reliable proxy for 
experienced affect (see Gottman and Levenson 1985).  
 
Results 
Manipulation Check. The novel set of sounds, surge and beluga whales, were 
rated to be less familiar than the conventional set of sounds, razor and helicopter 
(F(1,110)=52.19, p<.001). As well, the novel set of sounds were each less familiar than 
the universal sounds, mosquito and busy signal (each planned contrast p<.0001). 
 
Overall Evaluations. The overall evaluations of the sound sequence exhibited a 
significant 2 (intensity of first sound) X 2 (novelty of first sound) interaction 
(F(1,107)=10.55, p=.001). The overall evaluation for the sequence with the novel, intense 
first sound (M= -73.76) was significantly worse than the overall evaluation for the 
sequence with the novel, mild first sound (M= -56.12; t(55)=3.65, p<.001). On the other 
hand, the overall evaluation for the conventional sound sequences were not different from 
each other (t(52)=3.74,p >. 2). In fact, the direction of the influence was reversed: the 
sequence with the conventional, mild first sound was rated as more unpleasant (M= -
69.73) than the sequence with the conventional, intense first sound (M= -62.03); see 
figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 
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Figure 3: Mean overall evaluation of annoying sounds experience in study 1 as a function 
of intensity and novelty of the first sound. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
 
On-line Measures. The intense set of first sounds were rated to be worse on-line 
than the mild set of first sounds, as reflected in their average of moment-to-moment 
ratings (F(1,110)=110.35,p<.001). The planned contrasts were significant in both the 
novel and conventional set of sounds (Conventional: MIntense = -55.96, MMild = -33.75; 
Novel: MIntense = -71.49,  MMild = -32.11; both p<.001). However, this effect was larger in 
the novel set of sounds than in the conventional set of sounds (F(1,110)=8.57, p<.005). 
This result lends some support to a positive relationship between affective intensity and 
novelty, at least for the more intense set of sounds in this study (i.e., the novel surge 
sound was more aversive than the conventional razor sound). The second and third 
sounds were subject to hedonic contrast effects. The second sound (mosquito) was rated 
to be worse on-line when it followed a mild first sound than when it followed an intense 
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
Conventional Novel
O
ve
ra
ll
 E
va
lu
at
io
n
Mild Intense
59 
 
first sound (F(1,110)=11.85, p<.001). Similarly, the third sound (busy signal) was rated 
as more unpleasant in the mild first sound conditions (F(1,110)=9.93, p<.005). These 
hedonic contrast results may explain the reversal of overall evaluations in the 
conventional sounds conditions. If only the peak intensity and end intensity are reflected 
in overall evaluations, then overall evaluations would be more negative in the mild first 
sound condition than in the intense first sound condition, because the mild beginning led 
to more intense peaks and ends. On the other hand, if the intensity of the peak, end, and 
first sound are all reflected in overall evaluations, then the mild first sound may mitigate 
overall evaluations, as occurred in the novel condition. 
 
Regression Analysis. To explain overall evaluations while controlling for intensity 
differences by novelty condition, I regressed overall evaluations on participants’ on-line 
affect measures. In each model, predictors of overall evaluations were peak intensity, end 
intensity, novelty condition, a parameter based on on-line ratings collected during the 
first sound, and an interaction term for that parameter by novelty condition. These models 
account for two predictors established by prior theory: peak intensity and end intensity. 
For peak intensity I extracted participants’ maximum rating of on-line affect for the entire 
three-sound sequence. For end intensity I identified the mean of the last one second of 
on-line affect from the third sound. I varied the parameter for the first sound to be either 
the mean, median, or mode of on-line ratings collected during the first sound. The first 
sound can also be thought of as a separable experience for which its own peak intensity 
and end intensity may explain its remembered affect. As such, I extracted the peak 
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intensity and end intensity of only the first sound on-line ratings and used the combined 
peak-end to represent the affective response to the first sound. Thus, four models were 
analyzed with varying parameters to represent on-line affect from the first sound. The 
regression analyses revealed that peak intensity and end intensity (of the entire sequence) 
are significant predictors of overall evaluations (p<.01 for both predictors in each 
regression model). None of the four parameters based on the first sound on-line ratings is 
a significant predictor of overall evaluations (p>.35 in each model). This result is 
qualified by a significant interaction of the first sound parameter by novelty condition in 
each model (see table 1). Overall evaluations are better predicted by on-line ratings 
collected during the first sound in the novel than in the conventional condition. For 
example, the mean on-line rating of the first sound predicted overall evaluations better 
when the sound was novel than when it was conventional (t(105)=2.44, p=.016). 
Because the novel-intense first sound (surge) was rated as worse on-line than the 
conventional-intense first sound (razor), it was possible that the novel sound was more 
likely to include the peak of the sequence, which might contribute to these results due to 
peak intensity rather than novelty. However, in a restricted set of regression analyses, I 
considered only situations in which the peak of the sequence was not experienced during 
the first sound. Most participants experienced their peak only during the second sound, 
mosquito. The restricted analyses exclude 8 participants in the conventional and 20 
participants in the novel condition who also experienced their peak during the first sound. 
The same interaction of first sound parameter by novelty condition held with these 
restrictions (see table 1). 
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TABLE 1:   
Study 1 regression analysis results 
Table 1: Study 1 overall evaluations of unpleasantness were regressed on to peak 
intensity, end intensity, a dummy variable for novelty condition, a parameter representing 
the on-line evaluation of the first sound, and an interaction between this parameter and 
novelty condition. T-test values, listed below, test the significance of the interaction 
between the parameter and novelty condition. If the interaction is positive, the parameter 
had a larger influence on overall evaluations when the first sound was novel than when it 
was conventional. 
 
  
Parameter 
based on first 
sound on-line 
ratings t  p value 
All participants (n= 111) 
Mean 2.44 .0162 
Median 2.68 .0086 
Mode 2.67 .0088 
Peak+End 2.23 .0279 
Participants who did not 
experience their peak during 
the first sound (n= 83) 
Mean 2.19 .0317 
Median 2.58 .0118 
Mode 2.47 .0155 
Peak+End 3.00 .0037 
 
R2 Change Analysis. The effect size of the interaction can be illustrated by 
analyzing overall evaluations separately by novelty condition. I compared pairs of 
regression models in each condition in order to determine whether the affective response 
to the first sound accounted for significant unique variance in overall evaluations. In each 
condition a baseline model with just the peak and end intensity was compared to a model 
that includes one of the four parameters representing on-line affect derived from the first 
sound. The marginal influence of the first sound parameter on overall evaluations can be 
determined by the change in R2 from the baseline model to the larger model. 
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Across all four parameters tested, affective response to the first sound accounted for 
significant unique variance in overall evaluations when the first sound was novel but not 
when it was conventional (see table 2). For example, when the first sound was 
conventional, the smaller peak-end model accounted for 48.92% of the variance in 
overall evaluations, whereas a larger model with peak and end intensity of the sequence 
and the mean on-line rating of the first sound accounted for 49.15% of the variance. For 
the conventional first sound conditions, the mean on-line rating of the first sound was not 
a significant predictor of overall evaluations (b=.05, t(54)=.47,  p>.6), and adding this 
parameter did not improve the fit of the model (F(3,48)=0.07, p>.95). On the other hand, 
when the first sound was novel, the smaller model accounted for only 24.78% of the 
variance in overall evaluations, whereas the larger model accounted for 54.95% of the 
variance. In this case, the mean on-line rating of the first sound significantly predicted 
overall evaluations (b=0.45, t(57)=5.96, p<.001), and adding this parameter significantly 
improved the fit of the model (F(3,51)=11.38, p<.001). These changes in R2 were 
replicated across the other three parameters representing affective response to the first 
sound (median, mode, and peak-end of on-line ratings during the first sound). The results 
also held when the analysis was restricted to participants who did not experience their 
peak during the first sound. 
TABLE 2 
Study 1 R2 change analysis results 
Table 2: Study 1 overall evaluations were regressed on to on-line measures of affect. The 
baseline model includes peak and end intensity as predictors of overall evaluations. The 
larger, three-parameter models add one parameter representing on-line affect derived 
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from the first sound. R2 values for these models are listed below by novelty condition. P-
values are based on an R2 change analysis, comparing the larger model to the baseline 
model. 
  REGRESSION MODEL: 
R2 of model 
Conventional Novel 
All 
participants 
(n= 111) 
BASELINE: Peak and end intensity 
of sequence 48.92% 24.78% 
Peak and end intensity of sequence +     
Mean rating of first 
sound 49.15% 54.95%***
Median rating of first 
sound 49.00% 55.06%***
Modal rating of first 
sound 49.09% 55.89%***
Peak+End rating of first 
sound 48.95% 57.11%***
Participants 
who did not 
experience 
their peak 
during the 
first sound 
(n= 83) 
BASELINE: Peak and end intensity 
of sequence 27.35% 17.79% 
Peak and end intensity of sequence +     
Mean rating of first 
sound 27.36% 39.43%* 
Median rating of first 
sound 27.49% 42.62%** 
Modal rating of first 
sound 27.36% 43.96%** 
Peak+End rating of first 
sound 28.16% 48.85%***
 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
Discussion 
Study 1 found support for hypothesis 1, demonstrating that novel aspects of experiences 
are more likely to influence overall evaluations than conventional aspects when these 
aspects are not the peak or end of the experience. In this study, overall evaluations were 
pulled in the direction of the affective response to a novel but not a conventional 
beginning. This study also found that novelty is a separate factor from intensity. As 
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reviewed earlier, novel aspects can be more or less intense than conventional aspects. In 
this study, novelty was positively related to affective intensity. This relationship was 
evident in the on-line affect ratings, but it does not explain the difference in how 
influential the beginning sound’s intensity was on overall evaluations. The regression 
analysis accounts for any differences in experienced affect. As well, the novel beginning 
influenced overall evaluations at both intensity levels: The experience was considered 
more unpleasant when the novel beginning was intense and less unpleasant when the 
novel beginning was mild. This finding suggests that novelty is not an added measure 
that only enhances or only diminishes overall evaluations. Instead, novelty increases the 
influence of aspects of experiences on overall evaluations. 
 
One potential limitation of this study is in the measurement of on-line affect. The 
approach used here, measuring affect during a repeated presentation of the experience, 
helps to mitigate disruption arising from on-line measurement (see Ariely and Zauberman 
2000). This approach was motivated in part to reduce false negatives for testing on-line 
intensity differences. During a repeated presentation participants were better able to use 
the scale because they had been exposed to the entire range of stimuli and were not 
distracted by uncertain incoming information. However, it is possible that this approach 
introduces another set of concerns. Participants may have had expectations coming into 
the second experience, and on-line intensity ratings may be assimilated to these 
expectations. This possibility may be aggravated in the novel conditions, working against 
the hypothesis: Participants in the novel conditions would have formed more extreme 
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expectations because they had already provided more divergent overall evaluations. 
Alternatively, if the replay is rated without drawing on expectations, this repeated 
presentation may reveal reduced intensity differences if participants have adapted to the 
stimuli, which would provide an alternative explanation to the results. These 
measurement concerns can be explored in further studies that manipulate the timing of 
on-line affect measures—either during the experience or during a repeat of the 
experience.  
 
The results from study 1 are peculiar to extended experiences that comprise sequences of 
activity, in which novel aspects can become isolated when surrounded by conventional 
aspects. The basic effect of novelty found in study 1 places novelty alongside intensity 
and serial positioning as factors that influence the accessibility of aspects of experiences. 
In the next study I test how novelty differs from other factors in determining overall 
evaluations. Specifically, I examine the effect of novelty on immediate versus delayed 
overall evaluations. 
 
IX. Study 2: Manipulating the ending of annoying sounds  
Study 2 tests hypothesis 2a, the prediction that novel aspects will have a more enduring 
influence on overall evaluations than conventional aspects. I predict that the end intensity 
of an experience will influence immediate overall evaluations, replicating prior research. 
However, the end intensity of an experience will influence delayed overall evaluations 
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only if it is novel. This study uses a methodology similar to that of study 1: On-line 
experience was manipulated by including a conventional or novel sound to end a 
sequence of annoying sounds. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants (n=207), undergraduate and graduate 
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental 
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (conventional, novel 
end sound) X 2 (intense, mild end sound) X 2 (immediate-and-delayed evaluation, 
delayed-only evaluation) between-subjects design. 
 
Procedure. This study also involved an annoying sounds sequence. The sounds 
used in this study were the same as those in study 1, with the critical difference being that 
the focal sound was moved to the end of the sequence. The first two sounds in the 
sequence were “A mosquito buzzing close by” and “The busy signal for a telephone.” 
The third sound in the sequence varied as 2 (conventional, novel) X 2 (mild, intense) 
between-subjects design. The conventional sound was either “An electric razor being 
used to shave” (intense) or “A helicopter hovering” (mild). The novel sound was either 
“An electric surge caused by a voltage spike” (intense) or “Beluga whales 
communicating through clicking chatter” (mild). Participants listened to the sounds in the 
same way as in study 1, with the sequence coming at the beginning of the lab session. 
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Measures. Participants provided the same overall evaluation as in study 1. 
However, the timing of this measure varied. Some participants provided an overall 
evaluation immediately after the sequence concluded. These participants also provided a 
repeated measure at a second point in time, the end of the lab session. Other participants 
only provided an overall evaluation after this delay. The delayed set of measures (M=36 
minutes later) included the overall evaluation as well as the manipulation check of 
novelty, the same one used in study 1 and the pre-test. In this study, participants were not 
asked to provide an on-line measure of affect because such a measure was not necessary 
for testing the hypothesis or controlling for intensity differences, as will be discussed 
later. See figure 4 for a schematic depicting study 2. 
FIGURE 4 
Figure 4: Schematic depicting study 2. 
 
Results 
Manipulation Check. The novel set of sounds, surge and beluga whales, were 
rated to be less familiar than the conventional set of sounds, razor and helicopter 
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(F(1,187)=57.82, p<.001). As well, the novel set of sounds were each less familiar than 
the universal sounds, mosquito and busy signal (each planned contrast p<.0001). 
 
Overall Evaluations. Combining the overall evaluations formed immediately after 
the conclusion of the sequence with those formed only after a delay, there was a three-
way interaction between the final sound’s intensity, its novelty, and the timing of the 
overall evaluation (F(1, 192)=4.23, p=.04); see figure 5. The final sound’s intensity was 
reflected in immediate overall evaluations regardless of novelty condition, but only in 
delayed overall evaluations if the final sound was novel. There was also a main effect of 
timing of evaluations: Overall evaluations were lower in the delayed measure (F(1, 
192)=9.06, p<.01). In the following sections, these results are explained separately by the 
timing of the measure.  
FIGURE 5 
Study 2: Between-subject, Immediate versus Delay-Only Comparison 
Figure 5: Mean overall evaluation of annoying sounds experience in study 2 as a function 
of intensity and novelty of the final sound and timing of the overall evaluation. The left 
hand panel depicts overall evaluations measured immediately after the end of the 
experience, and the right hand panel depicts overall evaluations measured only after a 
delay. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Immediate Overall Evaluations. For overall evaluations that were formed 
immediately after the conclusion of the sequence (n=111), there was a main effect of the 
final sound’s intensity such that ending the experience with an intense sound pulled down 
overall evaluations (F(1, 107)=5.12, p<.01). There was no main effect of novelty (F(1, 
107)=2.21, p>.14) and no interaction between the final sound’s intensity and its novelty 
(F(1, 107)=1.07, p>.3). Planned contrasts revealed that the sequence with the 
conventional, intense end sound was rated as significantly worse than the sequence with 
the conventional, mild end sound (MIntense= -73.65, MMild= -57.05; t(51)=2.86, p<.001). 
The sequence with the novel, intense end sound was also rated as worse than the 
sequence with the novel, mild end sound (MIntense= -61.6,  MMild = -54.89), but this 
difference was not significant (t(56)=0.91, p>.3). 
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Delay-Only Overall Evaluations. Some participants (n=90) only provided an 
overall evaluation after the delay. For these delayed overall evaluations the main effect of 
the final sound’s intensity was muted (F(1, 86)=2.16, p>.14). There was no main effect 
of novelty (F(1, 86)=0.24, p>.6), but there was a marginally significant interaction 
between the final sound’s intensity and its novelty (F(1, 86)=2.78, p =.09). The sequence 
with the conventional, intense end sound was rated as nearly equally bad as the sequence 
with the conventional, mild end sound (MIntense= -72.4,  MMild= -73.35; t(48)=0.18, p>.8). 
On the other hand, the sequence with the novel, intense end sound was rated as worse 
than the sequence with the novel, mild end sound (MIntense= -78.05,  MMild = -62.95, 
t(38)=1.80, p=.08). 
 
Delay-Repeated Overall Evaluations. The same participants who provided an 
overall evaluation immediately after the sequence concluded also provided a second 
delayed overall evaluation measure. Fewer participants (n=101) responded to the 
repeated measure because 10 participants were not able to stay in the lab for the entire 
duration of the study. Repeated overall evaluations exhibited results consistent with 
immediate overall evaluations (see figure 6). There was a main effect of the final sound’s 
intensity (F(1, 97)=8.07, p<.01). There was a marginal main effect of novelty (F(1, 
97)=0.77, p=.08) and no interaction between the final sound’s intensity and its novelty 
(F(1, 97)=0.91, p>.3). Planned contrasts revealed that the sequence with the 
conventional, intense end sound was rated as significantly worse than the sequence with 
the conventional, mild end sound (MIntense= -75.07,  MMild= -56.8; t(46)=2.96, p<.005). 
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The sequence with the novel, intense end sound was also rated as worse than the 
sequence with the novel, mild end sound (MIntense= -69.07, MMild= -60), but this difference 
was not significant (t(51)=1.25, p>.2). A repeated measures model that includes within-
subjects effects for the timing of the overall evaluation measure shows that the main 
effect of the final sound’s intensity, the main effect of novelty, and the interaction of 
these stimulus characteristics on overall evaluation did not differ across the timing of the 
measure (all p>.25). However, there was a marginal main effect of the timing of 
evaluation: Overall evaluations were lower in the second measure (F(1, 97)=3.52, 
p=.06). 
FIGURE 6 
Study 2: Within-subject, Immediate versus Delay-Repeated Comparison 
Figure 6: Mean overall evaluation of annoying sounds experience in study 2 as a function 
of intensity and novelty of the final sound and timing of the overall evaluation. The left 
hand panel depicts overall evaluations measured immediately after the end of the 
experience, and the right hand panel depicts repeated overall evaluations measured after a 
delay. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 provides evidence for hypothesis 2a, demonstrating that the end intensity of an 
experience influences immediate evaluations, but the end intensity only influences 
delayed evaluations if it is novel. Unlike study 1, on-line affect was not measured in this 
study, because the pattern of means supports the temporal interaction interpretation. If 
there were differences in intensity between the novel and conventional sounds, this 
should be captured by the immediate overall evaluations when the experience was fresh 
in memory. Instead, novelty only influenced overall evaluations after a delay. The 
proposed explanation for this result is differences in memory interference and retrieval. 
When the sequence of sounds had just been experienced, participants had little difficulty 
in accessing the most recent sound they encountered, resulting in both conventional and 
novel ends influencing overall evaluations. After a delay, conventional sounds were less 
accessible because recency effects diminish for delayed memory tasks (Bjork and 
Whitten 1974), and these sounds were similar to other sounds encountered outside of the 
lab. In contrast, because the novel sounds were unique to the specific episode, they were 
still accessible after a delay and continued to influence overall evaluations. 
 
It is also noteworthy that delay-only overall evaluations differed from delay-repeated 
overall evaluations, which were not influenced by novelty. When people form an overall 
evaluation for the first time, their on-the-spot construction of the overall evaluation will 
depend on which aspects are accessible at that time. However, once an overall evaluation 
is formed, people might not completely re-interpret the experience on subsequent 
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judgment occasions. Instead, they may rely to some extent on their earlier judgment 
(Ariely and Zauberman 2003; Feldman and Lynch 1988). The differences between delay-
only and delay-repeated overall evaluations found in this study suggest that people do not 
always form spontaneous overall evaluations of affective experiences, lending support to 
previous research with similar findings in other affective judgments (e.g., Novemsky and 
Ratner 2003; Nunes and Novemsky 2008).  
 
Whereas novelty influenced delay-only overall evaluations differently than delay-
repeated overall evaluations, both measures exhibited some bias compared to immediate 
evaluations. Specifically, overall evaluations were worse in the delay-repeated evaluation 
compared to the immediate evaluation, replicating the main effect of timing of evaluation 
found in the between-subjects comparison (i.e., immediate vs. delay-only overall 
evaluations). Employing an unmarked sliding scale to measure overall evaluations 
prevented participants from retrieving a specific number they had provided earlier. As 
such, participants forming a delay-repeated overall evaluation were not retrieving their 
earlier judgment directly, but instead were affected to some extent by bias in their 
memory for the experience. The present investigation is silent on the source of such bias. 
However, based on prior research, one could argue that participants relied on a more 
extreme theory-driven memory for the annoying sounds experience when forming 
delayed overall evaluations (Robinson and Clore 2002). Alternatively, evaluations may 
have worsened over time due to the particular context of the later evaluation (e.g., 
incidental mood was translated into more unpleasant memories of the annoying sounds).  
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If delay-repeated judgments were also biased why were these judgments not influenced 
by novelty? One plausible explanation is that rendering an immediate overall evaluation 
helped participants encode the experience. Even if delay-repeated judgments were biased, 
they were not completely baseless as participants were still able to incorporate 
differences in end intensity. This result may be specific to the experimental context, and 
it is possible that other judgment domains may show delay-repeated evaluations 
converging to delay-only evaluations. In many experiences that are not directly 
monitored, people’s overall evaluations may not be so explicitly stated, resulting in 
poorer encoding of immediate attitudes and lesser correspondence between immediate 
and delay-repeated overall evaluations. Consequently, in those situations novelty may 
also have an impact on delay-repeated overall evaluations. Further studies can test 
different forms of measuring overall evaluations to examine if immediate overall 
evaluations would still concur with delay-repeated overall evaluations with these other 
measurements. 
 
One alternative explanation for the set of findings in this study is that encountering novel 
aspects encourages spontaneous evaluations, resulting in better correspondence between 
immediate and delay-only overall evaluations in the novel conditions. However, although 
encountering a novel aspect may lead participants to spontaneously encode their on-line 
affect, it is less likely that they would spontaneously summarize the overall experience 
investigated here. The experience was designed without a script, the three sounds were 
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loosely tied, and the study did not have a cover story. I argue that in this context people 
would only form an overall evaluation when they were asked to consider all three sounds 
together. Otherwise, participants had no purpose for evaluating the entire experience in 
terms of one summarized assessment. On the other hand, one could speculate in more 
naturalistic experiences that encountering a novel aspect may enhance consumers’ 
monitoring of the overall experience, which would contribute to the results due to more 
spontaneous immediate construction of an overall evaluation.  
 
Further, the amount of time used for the delay in this study should be generalized with 
caution. This study involved a short affective experience lasting only 48 seconds with 
little sensory information. Participants did not have a personal stake in the outcome of the 
experience as they would with goal-directed experiences. In this study, approximately 35 
minutes was sufficient for evaluations to differ systematically, driven by novelty and a 
general worsening of evaluations. One might imagine that for a more involving 
experience, such as a week-long vacation, a longer delay would be necessary to reveal 
such discrepancies between immediate and delayed overall evaluations.  
 
As with study 1, this study investigates how novelty influences the accessibility and 
weighting of aspects in overall evaluations of affect. Study 2 demonstrates that one aspect 
of an experience, its end, has an immediate influence on overall evaluations that does not 
depend on novelty, but it has a delayed influence that is strengthened by novelty. In the 
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next study I examine delayed overall evaluations of experiences in which the novelty of 
the entire experience is varied. 
 
X. Study 3: Fractals study  
Study 3 tests hypothesis 2b, the prediction that overall evaluations will be more accurate, 
reflecting on-line affect, if an experience is unique versus if an experience is common. 
This study used a different methodology compared to study 1 and 2. On-line affect was 
measured for an experience in which participants viewed pleasant artistic shapes. Novelty 
was reduced through prior exposure. In this study, a relatively novel set of images was 
presented, which was not unique for some participants due to prior exposure to similar 
images. As such, this study tests a dimension of novelty—amount of accumulated 
experience—and focuses on the interference mechanism predicted by the isolation effect 
research. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants (n=64), undergraduate and graduate 
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental 
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a one factor between-
subjects design in which the entire experience was or was not unique: Participants were 
either exposed to (n=34) or not exposed (n=30) to similar images in the recent past as a 
manipulation of experience frequency. 
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Procedure. The focal experience in this study was viewing a series of artistic 
shapes on a computer program. The shapes selected for this task were all fractal images 
culled from a website that included a gallery of fractals. A fractal is a shape that can be 
split into parts, each of which is approximately a microcosm of the whole shape. 
Mathematicians study fractals because they have properties similar to shapes from the 
natural world, such as coastlines and snowflakes. Consumers also enjoy looking at 
fractals, which are sometimes depicted in posters and screensavers. Due to the well-
defined mathematical properties of fractals, new fractal images can be created by 
computer programs, leading to a proliferation of distinct images with similar appearance. 
See figure 7 for a sample of a fractal displayed in the focal experience.  
FIGURE 7 
Figure 7: Example of a fractal image displayed in the focal experience for study 3. 
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The study proceeded in three stages within the lab session. See figure 8 for a schematic 
depicting the stages of the study. At the beginning of the session, participants were either 
exposed to 20 images of fractals or no images as a between-subjects manipulation of 
prior exposure. The images were displayed on a computer screen. The computer program 
advanced each image after an exposure period of 2.2 seconds. Participants who viewed 
these images were not asked to report their on-line affect, and no cover story was 
provided for the image viewing task. Participants in the unique experience condition 
instead engaged in other lab studies, which were not related to fractals or viewing images. 
After this first stage of the study, all participants moved on to other unrelated 
experiments in the lab session. 
 
FIGURE 8 
Figure 8: Schematic depicting the three stages of study 3. 
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In the second stage, M=25 minutes later all participants saw a set of seven focal images. 
These seven images were different from the 20 that participants in the prior exposure 
condition viewed earlier. Participants controlled the pace at which they viewed the seven 
images, and they responded to an on-line measure of affect. The first of the seven images 
was viewed the longest (M=5.42 seconds), but all other images were viewed very briefly 
(range from M=2.33 seconds to M=3.21 seconds). This second stage of the study, which 
comprised the entire viewing task, was brief (M=21.53 seconds).  
 
After viewing the images, participants moved on to stage three, which included the delay 
and the overall evaluation measure. Immediately after the fractal viewing experience, all 
participants experienced a delay lasting approximately five minutes. During this delay, 
participants listened to the theme song from Chariots of Fire and read three short poems: 
'Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening' by Robert Frost, 'There is another sky' by 
Emily Dickinson, and 'Composed Upon Westminster Bridge' by William Wordsworth. 
These traditional artistic experiences were selected to occupy participants’ time so that 
they would not be aggravated by an empty wait. After these other tasks concluded, 
participants responded to the overall evaluation measure. 
 
Measures. As they viewed the focal set of fractal images, participants were asked 
to rate each image for its on-line enjoyment. Specifically, participants were asked “How 
much do you enjoy looking at this image?” They responded on a 15-point scale from 1 
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(“Not at all”) to 15 (“Very much”). After they clicked on a response, the computer 
program advanced and displayed the next image with the same rating scale.  
 
The key delayed measure was the overall evaluation of the experience. In an instructions 
section provided prior to this measure, participants in the unique experience condition 
were asked to consider the images they saw, whereas participants in the prior exposure 
condition were asked to focus only on the most recent set of images they saw. This 
instruction was necessary to ensure that prior exposure condition participants would 
focus on the same set of images as those considered by participants in the unique 
experience condition. For participants in the prior exposure condition the approximately 
half-hour delay between the prior exposure task and the focal experience, the stark 
differences in the number of images (20 vs. 7), and the procedural differences in viewing 
experience (images that automatically advanced as a slideshow versus images that were 
controlled through on-line affect ratings) helped to alleviate any confusion as to which set 
of images the overall evaluation was referring to. All participants were asked, “Overall, 
how much did you enjoy looking at these images?” Their responses were collected on an 
unmarked sliding scale that resembled the overall evaluation scale used in studies 1 and 
2: Participants moved a probe to a position on a line anchored by “Did not enjoy at all” to 
“Enjoyed a lot.” The probe’s singular position on the scale was translated to a number 
from 0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating more overall enjoyment. 
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Results 
On-line Measures. Ratings of enjoyment during the image viewing experience revealed 
some differences by frequency condition. The average of on-line ratings across all seven 
images differed marginally: Participants who viewed fractal images previously enjoyed 
the focal experience less than participants for whom the focal experience was unique 
(MPrior Exposure=7.55, MUnique=8.91; t(62)=1.80, p=.08). An image-by-image analysis 
suggests that this result was driven by the low of the experience, defined as the least 
enjoyed image. The low for participants in the prior exposure condition was less enjoyed 
than the low for participants in the unique experience condition (MPrior Exposure=3.97, 
MUnique=5.66; t(62)=2.03, p=.04). No specific image was the low for all participants, but 
two images exhibited significantly less enjoyment in the prior exposure condition: the 
first image (t(62)=2.38, p=.02) and the fourth image (t(62)=2.26, p=.03). As such, this 
study finds a negative relationship between experience frequency and intensity of 
enjoyment, at least for two images and the low of the experience. However, the peak of 
the experience, defined as the most enjoyed image, did not differ in enjoyment by 
frequency condition (MPrior Exposure=11.53, MUnique=12.3; t(62)=1.20,  p=.23). Because 
only ten participants (3 in the prior exposure and 7 in the unique experience condition) 
maxed out on the scale for rating their most enjoyed image, this lack of difference is 
unlikely to be due to a ceiling effect. The end of the experience (i.e., the final image in 
the sequence) also did not differ in enjoyment by frequency condition (MPrior Exposure=7.58, 
MUnique=8.36; t(62)=0.77,  p=.44). 
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Overall Evaluations. The delayed overall evaluation for the viewing experience did not 
differ by frequency condition. Participants who had viewed fractal images previously 
evaluated the focal experience as being just as enjoyable in retrospect as participants who 
had not viewed fractal images previously (MPrior Exposure=59.24, MUnique=62.94; t(62)=0.69, 
p=.49).  
 
Regression Analysis. The main outcome of interest in this study was and the extent to 
which delayed overall evaluations reflected on-line affect. There were seven measures of 
on-line affect in this study, each based on one of the seven images displayed. Regressing 
the delayed overall evaluation on all seven of these measures resulted in different 
coefficients of determination for the regression model by frequency condition. The seven 
on-line ratings accounted for only 39% of the variation in overall evaluations for the prior 
exposure condition but 70% of the variation in overall evaluations for the unique 
experience condition. However, in either condition this regression model was inefficient: 
None of the on-line measures significantly predicted overall evaluations when all seven 
measures were included in the model. In addition, the overall trend of the experience, 
defined as the linear trend of all seven on-line measures for each participant, was not a 
significant predictor of overall evaluations when considered alone in a regression analysis 
(p>.5 for both conditions). On the other hand, the mean of on-line measures and each 
individual on-line measure was a significant predictor of overall evaluations when 
considered in separate regression analyses (with the exception of the third on-line 
measure in the prior exposure condition). As well, each predictor explained more of the 
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variation in overall evaluations for the unique experience condition than for the prior 
exposure condition (see table 3).  
TABLE 3 
Study 3 regression analysis results, beta coefficients 
 
Table 3: Predictors of overall enjoyment of the fractal viewing experience in study 3. 
Overall evaluations were regressed on to each predictor in separate regression models. 
Beta coefficients for each predictor are provided for the combined analysis as well as the 
separate analyses for each frequency condition.  
 
 
Combined analysis   
N=64 
Prior exposure 
condition  
N=34 
Unique 
experience 
condition N=30 
Mean 0.72*** 0.59*** 0.82*** 
Trend -0.01 0.11 -0.09 
Peak 0.55*** 0.33* 0.71*** 
Low 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.62*** 
Image 1 0.65*** 0.5** 0.77*** 
Image 2 0.56*** 0.38* 0.72*** 
Image 3 0.44*** 0.24 0.65*** 
Image 4 0.55*** 0.43** 0.67*** 
Image 5 0.55*** 0.47** 0.64*** 
Image 6 0.66*** 0.57*** 0.74*** 
Image 7(end) 0.62*** 0.51** 0.69*** 
 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
 
 
The peak of on-line ratings is a theoretically informed predictor of overall evaluations. 
Peak intensity accounted for 11% of the variation in overall evaluations for the prior 
exposure condition and 51% of the variation in overall evaluations for the unique 
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experience condition. In order to test whether peak intensity determined overall 
evaluations differently by frequency condition, I combined both conditions in a 
regression analysis. Specifically, I regressed overall evaluations on the on-line peak 
intensity, a dummy variable for frequency condition, and the interaction of peak intensity 
by frequency condition. This model resulted in a significant peak by frequency condition 
interaction (t(60)=2.27, p=.03), suggesting that the peak intensity had a larger influence 
on overall evaluations when the experience was unique. 
 
One potential explanation for this interaction may be that the peak was more intense in 
the unique experience condition, resulting in the peak being more accessible in the unique 
experience than in the prior exposure condition. Although participants’ rating of their 
peak did not differ by condition (t(62)=1.20,  p=.23), the subjective intensity of their 
peak might also depend on the intensity of the other aspects they had experienced in the 
focal episode. In further analyses I normalized peak intensity by including relevant 
control variables in separate regression analyses. The peak by frequency condition 
interaction was significant even when including each of the following predictors as 
control variables to normalize peak intensity: the mean of other on-line ratings 
(t(59)=1.98, p=.05), the range of on-line ratings—by extension, the low of on-line ratings 
(t(59)=2.35, p=.02), and the kurtosis of distribution of on-line ratings, which captured the 
peakedness of on-line ratings (t(59)=2.27, p=.02). As well, 23 participants rated more 
than one image at their peak level, but including the number of peaks as a control 
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variable still resulted in a significant peak by frequency condition interaction in the 
regression analysis (t(59)=2.09, p=.04). 
 
The peak by frequency condition interaction is particularly relevant to existing theory. 
Moreover, this interaction was also replicated for other aspects of the experience. This 
suggests that delayed overall evaluations reflect general loss of on-line affect for 
previously exposed but not unique experiences, and this loss of on-line affect is not just 
contained to peak intensity. I performed additional regression analyses separately for all 
seven on-line measures. In each analysis, overall evaluations were regressed on to one 
on-line measure, a dummy variable for frequency condition, and the interaction of the on-
line measure by frequency condition (see table 4). These analyses revealed that the 
interaction was directionally consistent across all seven on-line measures: Each on-line 
measure had a larger influence on overall evaluations when the experience was unique. 
Three of these interactions were significant (for the second, third, and fourth on-line 
measures), one interaction was marginally significant (for the first on-line measure), and 
three interactions were not significant (the fifth, sixth, and seventh on-line measures). 
Moreover, regressing overall evaluations on the mean of on-line measures, frequency 
condition, and the interaction of the mean by condition resulted in a marginally 
significant interaction (t(60)=1.70, p=.09). Although the mean is based on seven on-line 
measures, as an individual parameter it models overall evaluations most parsimoniously, 
accounting for the greatest variance in overall evaluations in each condition. As well, no 
other predictor accounts for significant unique variance in overall evaluations beyond the 
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mean of on-line measures. Due to high correlation between on-line measures, overall 
evaluations can also be predicted well by fewer on-line measures, but no model predicts 
overall evaluations better in the prior exposure condition than in the unique experience 
condition. 
TABLE 4 
Study 3 regression analysis results, interaction terms 
Table 4: Study 3 T-test values for the interaction between each predictor of overall 
enjoyment and frequency condition. Overall evaluations were regressed on to each 
predictor in separate regression models. Each model also included a dummy variable for 
frequency condition and the interaction of the predictor by frequency condition.  
 
  t p value 
Mean 1.7 .09 
Mean excluding peak 1.79 .08 
Trend -0.77 .44 
Peak 2.27 .03 
Peak controlling for:     
Mean of non-peak on-line measures 1.98 .05 
Range of on-line measures 2.35 .02 
Kurtosis of distribution for on-line measures 2.27 .03 
Number of peaks 2.09 .04 
Image 1 1.83 .07 
Image 2 2.45 .01 
Image 3 2.77 .01 
Image 4 1.96 .05 
Image 5 1.62 .11 
Image 6 1.61 .11 
Image 7 (end) 1.14 .26 
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Discussion 
This study provides evidence for hypothesis 2b, demonstrating that delayed overall 
evaluations are more reflective of on-line affect if the experience is unique. From the 
standpoint of existing theory it is particularly noteworthy that the peak intensity had a 
larger influence on overall evaluations when the experience was unique. This provides a 
moderator of the peak’s influence on overall evaluations. As well, the greater influence of 
peak intensity on overall evaluation in the unique experience condition was not offset by 
other aspects having a larger influence on overall evaluations in the prior exposure 
condition. Instead, each on-line measure explained overall evaluations better in the 
unique experience condition than in the prior exposure condition.  
 
If delayed overall evaluations in the prior exposure condition were less likely to capture 
on-line affect, what else might these overall evaluations reflect? Consistent with the 
isolation effect research, I argue that participants in the prior exposure condition were 
unable to access their on-line affect from the focal episode because their previous 
experiences interfered when they were forming delayed overall evaluations. As such, one 
predictor of overall evaluations could be the affect participants experienced in previous, 
related episodes. Participants’ on-line affect for the previously viewed images was not 
measured in this study. In a future study it would be useful to measure on-line affect for 
initial experiences and to examine whether these on-line measures predict overall 
evaluations for a later, focal experience.  
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Whereas in studies 1 and 2 novelty was pre-tested for different stimuli, in this study 
novelty was manipulated through prior exposure. This alternative approach for 
manipulating novelty disentangles novelty from other domain-specific stimulus 
characteristics, because all participants in study 3 rated the same set of focal images. 
Thus, this study establishes that a dimension of novelty—amount of accumulated 
experience—affects the accessibility of the experience in overall evaluations of affect. By 
examining degree of prior experience at one range of a continuum (i.e., from unique to 
less novel) instead of a broader spectrum (i.e., from novel to conventional), this study 
isolates the role of memory interference. Yet, there could be other mechanisms in 
retrospective evaluations that occur over wider ranges of prior experience. In fact, as 
people accumulate a great deal of experience in a domain, they may form enduring 
affective representations of these experiences, which might tie on-line and remembered 
affect together (Breckler 1994; Breckler and Wiggins 1989, 1993). This possibility will 
be discussed later in the dissertation. 
 
XI. Study 4: Browsing study 
Study 4 tests hypothesis 3, the prediction that more accumulated experience in a domain 
will improve recall of attribute quality levels, but diminish recall for on-line affect, as 
revealed by retrospective evaluations. This study also generalizes the study of novelty to 
a different domain: a consumer browsing experience. Consumers visiting web-based and 
retail stores are regularly exposed to sequences of options when they browse through 
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items in a product category. Evaluating these search experiences retrospectively, 
consumers may recall the quality levels of available options or their subjective shopping 
experience. Such evaluations also exhibit effects identified in the snapshot model 
literature. Diehl and Zauberman (2005) found that when product sets were extensively 
searched overall evaluations were more positive for sequences with improving orderings 
of options compared to those with declining orderings—an effect  predicted by the 
preference for improving trends.  
 
In this study, on-line affect and encountered information were jointly manipulated in the 
focal browsing experience. Overall evaluations were either based on encountered 
information (quality levels of options) or experienced affect (satisfaction with the 
browsing experience). Degree of novelty was manipulated by subsequent exposure to 
similar browsing experiences. Thus, this study reveals how amount of accumulated 
experience—a dimension of novelty—influences both learning and memory interference 
in overall evaluations of experiences. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants (n=189), undergraduate and graduate 
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental 
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (common, unique focal 
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browsing experience) X 2 (improving, declining final trend of focal browsing experience) 
X 2 (informational, hedonic overall evaluation) between-subjects design. 
 
Procedure. This study proceeded in three stages: (1) a focal browsing experience, 
(2) decoy browsing experiences, and (3) delayed evaluations. Each stage is described 
separately. See figure 9 for a schematic depicting the three stages of the study. 
FIGURE 9 
Figure 9: Schematic depicting the three stages of study 4. 
 
 
 
Stage 1: Focal browsing experience 
In the focal experience, participants engaged in a browsing task in which they examined 
jogging stroller options in a simulated web-based store called ‘Store A.’ Since 
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participants were overwhelmingly child-less undergraduate students, few participants 
were expected to have prior experience in this product category. As such, the product 
category was explained to participants in an instructions section (see figure 10).  
FIGURE 10 
Figure 10: Instructions section for study 4. 
 
 
 
Consistent with the agent-search procedure followed by Diehl and Zauberman (2005), 
study 4 participants were asked to consider jogging stroller profiles according to another 
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consumer’s preferences. Specifically, they were instructed to browse through the options 
as if they were searching for a stroller for a parent interested in making a purchase. 
Strollers were to be described on two characteristics: “maneuverability” and “comfort for 
baby.” Participants were told to weight comfort twice as much as maneuverability when 
assessing each option. The Store A sequence involved seven product profiles, numbered 
1 through 7. Each product was described on the two attributes using horizontal bars filled 
at different levels to reflect performance on each attribute (see figure 11). Participants 
controlled the pace at which they viewed the product profiles, and each profile was 
generally viewed briefly (M=3.04 seconds). 
 
FIGURE 11 
Figure 11: Example of jogging stroller profile for study 4. 
 
 
Participants could infer the utility of each jogging stroller option based on the levels of 
fill for its horizontal bars. Although numerical attribute values were not provided, these 
values could be assessed visually. Each bar was filled at a percentage level in the range of 
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5% to 95% in increments of 10% (i.e., 5%, 15%, 25%, etc.). The first three product 
profiles were the same for all participants. However, attribute quality levels for profiles 4 
– 7 were manipulated by final trend condition: Participants in the declining final trend 
condition were exposed to product profiles with declining performance on both attributes, 
whereas participants in the improving final trend condition were exposed to improving 
product profiles (see table 5). Participants were not informed about the trend of the 
sequence directly, but instead were to discover it independently. An improving final trend 
would lead to higher average quality ratings and was expected to lead to more satisfaction 
with the search process. 
 
TABLE 5 
Study 4 attribute quality levels for focal browsing experience 
 
Table 5: Performance on each attribute for the seven product profiles in the focal 
browsing sequence of study 4. Attribute values represent the percentage of the bar filled 
in the graphical depiction of attribute performance. Profiles 1 through 3 are the same, but 
profiles 4 – 7 differ by final trend condition.  
 
 Condition: Profile # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Declining 
final trend 
Maneuverability (%) 55 65 55 45 25 15 15
Comfort for baby (%) 75 65 25 15 35 5 25
Improving 
final trend 
Maneuverability (%) 55 65 55 75 85 65 85
Comfort for baby (%) 75 65 25 65 85 85 95
 
Total utility of each option could be calculated as performance on maneuverability plus 
performance on comfort for baby, weighted twice. Thus, converting percentage values to 
points, the maximum utility of each option was 300 points (both attributes at 100%). 
94 
 
Product profiles ranged in total utility from 25 points to 275 points (see figure 12). The 
average total utility was M=109.29 points for the declining final trend sequence and 
M=210.71 points for the improving final trend sequence.  
 
FIGURE 12 
Figure 12: Total utility of each option in the focal browsing sequences of study 4. 
 
 
Stage 2: Decoy browsing experiences 
After browsing through focal Store A, participants visited the other simulated 
web-based stores, B, C, and D, which offered the decoy browsing experiences. In an 
instructions section provided to participants immediately after the focal browsing 
sequence, some participants were told that they would browse through three more web-
based stores that would feature jogging strollers. Other participants were told that they 
would browse through three web-based stores that would offer backpacks. As such, 
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through subsequent exposure to sequences, the focal experience’s product domain would 
either be common or unique. In addition, participants were instructed to either focus on 
the quality of options they would see (informational evaluation condition) or their search 
satisfaction with the browsing process (hedonic evaluation condition) as they browsed 
through the decoy stores. Specifically, they were told to either “think about the quality of 
(jogging strollers, backpacks) available at each store” (informational) or to “think about 
how you feel about the search process” (hedonic). This instruction to focus on 
informational or hedonic aspects of the experience was provided before and after the 
presentation of each sequence. Importantly, this instruction was also provided 
immediately after the focal sequence. 
 
The subsequent sequences of jogging strollers that participants saw in the common-
experience condition offered the same type of product profiles as in Store A. However, 
these decoy stores differed in their pattern of quality, number of options, and presentation 
format. Each decoy store had an average total utility of 165 points across its jogging 
stroller profiles. As such, the average quality of these three decoy stores’ offerings was 
roughly halfway between the two manipulated levels of focal Store A (i.e., between 
109.29 and 210.71). None of the subsequent stores had a discernable trend of quality (see 
figure 13). Store B featured 11 options, whereas Store C had five and Store D had eight 
jogging stroller profiles respectively. Store D’s jogging stroller profiles were presented at 
a pre-determined pace, 3.2 seconds per profile. In contrast, participants were able to 
control the pace at which they viewed profiles in stores B and C. Finally, each store was 
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also associated with a particular background color (blue for Store B, yellow for Store C, 
and orange for Store D) which differed from the background color of Store A (green). 
These differences aided participants’ ability to discriminate between stores and ensured 
that participants would experience different levels of search satisfaction by store. 
Additionally, the varying patterns of total utility could help participants learn about the 
range of average quality across stores. 
 
FIGURE 13 
Figure 13: Total utility of each option in the subsequent (decoy) browsing sequences of 
study 4. 
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Participants who browsed through backpack sequences engaged in a similar task but in a 
different domain. These participants examined 11 backpacks in Store B, five in Store C, 
and 8 in Store D. The color and presentation time used in these backpack stores were also 
equivalent to the jogging stroller stores. However, rather than assessing products by 
reading graphical bars, participants viewed pictures of different backpacks and were 
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presented the corresponding names of backpack models (see figure 14). Actual brand 
names and backpack pictures were provided, extracted from Amazon.com listings. 
Participants were instructed to browse through the backpacks, assessing quality according 
to their own preferences. Thus, the quality patterns for these stores were not controlled 
experimentally.  
FIGURE 14 
Figure 14: Example of backpack profile for study 4. 
 
 
Stage 3: Delayed evaluations 
 After completing the browsing sequences in stores B, C, and D, participants 
moved on to other, unrelated tasks in the lab. After this delay (M=27.78 minutes) 
participants were prompted to recall the focal browsing sequence in Store A: They were 
asked to form a retrospective evaluation of either the average quality levels of jogging 
strollers or their overall satisfaction with the search process. Zauberman et al.’s (2006) 
studies similarly manipulated type of evaluation through different prompts. In this study, 
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participants in the informational evaluation condition first were asked to reproduce the 
average performance of each attribute using unmarked sliding scales. They then were 
asked, “What was the average quality level of Store A's jogging strollers?” They 
responded using a 100-point scale to provide this direct estimate. Participants in the 
hedonic evaluation condition only formed a direct overall evaluation of their search 
satisfaction. They were asked: “Recall your experience searching for a high quality 
jogging stroller in online Store A. Overall, how satisfied did you feel with the search at 
this store?” For both the informational and hedonic direct estimates, participants 
responded by inputting a number between 0 and 100 in a textbox, where higher numbers 
indicated higher average quality levels or overall satisfaction. 
 
Participants were also asked about the perceived novelty of browsing in each product 
category. First, participants were asked how familiar they were with the jogging stroller 
product category, which they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Not at all familiar”) to 7 
(“Very familiar”). Second, they were asked how often they use a jogging stroller, which 
they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Never”) to 7 (“Very often”). Third, they were 
asked how knowledgeable they were about jogging strollers, which they responded to on 
a scale from 1 (“Not at all knowledgeable”) to 7 (“Very knowledgeable”). Participants 
then answered the same three questions for the backpack product category. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
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Participants rated the backpack browsing experience as much less novel than the jogging 
stroller browsing experience, as revealed by paired differences in the three novelty 
manipulation check questions (all t(189)>22, all p<.0001). 
 
Retrospective evaluations with no statistical controls  
While hedonic evaluations were only measured directly, informational evaluations were 
measured in two ways: by directly recalling average total utility and by reproducing 
average attribute quality levels. Thus, total utility could be calculated by using 
participants’ recalled performance for maneuverability and comfort for baby, adding the 
two values and doubling the weight for comfort. This calculated estimate correlated 
highly with directly provided judgments (r(93)=0.67, p<.0001). I report analyses based 
on directly provided judgments; analyses based on calculated estimates are equivalent. 
 
A basic model including all between-subjects factors and their interactions revealed that 
neither the three-way interaction nor any of the two-way interactions were significant 
(F(1, 181)<1 in all cases), but significant main effects were obtained (see figure 15). As 
expected, evaluations were higher for the improving final trend sequences compared to 
the declining final trend sequences (F(1, 181)=32.55, p<.0001). Evaluations were more 
positive when the browsing experience was common compared to when it was unique 
(F(1, 181)=5.65, p=.02), and evaluations were also higher for hedonic compared to 
informational evaluations (F(1, 181)=9.72, p<.01). These latter two results were 
peripheral to the main phenomenon of interest and were not anticipated by the 
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hypotheses. I remain agnostic as to their underlying causes, but stimulus calibration may 
be responsible. The main effect of experience frequency could occur simply as a 
byproduct of the stimuli employed (e.g, Store A was seen in a more positive light when 
compared to stores B, C, and D). The main effect of evaluation type could be a result of 
differences in scale usage, or it could indicate that participants were largely satisfied with 
the search experience, even if the average quality of options was more modest.  
FIGURE 15 
Study 4: Overall analysis of retrospective evaluations 
Figure 15: Mean overall evaluation of focal browsing experience in study 4 as a function 
of type of retrospective evaluation, experience frequency, and experienced final trend. 
The left hand panel depicts retrospective judgments of average quality, and the right hand 
panel depicts overall evaluations of search satisfaction. “Down” refers to the declining 
final trend condition, and “Up” refers to the improving final trend condition. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
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Retrospective evaluations, controlling for immediate evaluation time 
The results reported above were not consistent with the predictions set prior to the study. 
Specifically, a three-way interaction was predicted: It was expected that retrospective 
evaluations would track final trend differences for informational evaluations only when 
the experience was common and for hedonic evaluations only when the experience was 
unique. Instead, final trend differences were large regardless of the frequency of the 
experience or the form of retrospective evaluation.  
 
These results suggest that participants were highly accurate in their recall for both 
attribute levels and experienced satisfaction. The tendency for participants to form 
immediate assessments may explain this ceiling effect on accuracy of recall. As such, in 
further analyses I examined the role of time spent on the decoy experiences, when 
participants were likely to form on-line impressions of each subsequent sequence and the 
focal browsing experience. Presumably, participants who spent more time on this second 
stage were likely to more carefully form immediate impressions, mitigating any effect of 
the other manipulated factors. It should be noted that this control was not manipulated as 
part of the experimental design a priori, but instead was selected due to the finding that 
participants were highly accurate in their recall.  
 
A larger model that included all manipulated factors and their interactions as well as time 
spent on stage two of the study and its interaction with the other variables obtains the 
effect predicted. This analysis finds no main effect of final trend (F(1, 173)=0.01, p>.9), 
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no main effect of experience frequency (F(1, 173)=1.41, p>.2), and only a marginally 
significant effect of type of evaluation (F(1, 173)=3.51, p=.06). However, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between final trend, experience frequency, and type of 
evaluation (F(1, 173)=6.37, p=.01) as well as a significant four-way interaction where 
this effect was moderated by amount of time spent on the second stage of the study (F(1, 
173)=4.83,  p=.03). 
 
The median time spent on the second stage of the study was 32 seconds. Using the 
median split of this variable as an additional factor in an analysis would result in 
insufficient power (see Irwin and McClelland 2003). Nonetheless, I describe the pattern 
of means along a median split for expositional purposes. This pattern is consistent with 
the predictions for participants who spent less than the median time on the second stage 
of the study. When these participants were judging the average quality level of the focal 
browsing sequence, uniqueness led to less accurate recalled quality ratings. Final trend 
effects were large when the sequence was common (MDown = 49.67, MUp = 72.38) but 
very small when the sequence was unique (MDown = 41, MUp = 45.88). On the other hand, 
when participants evaluated their overall satisfaction with the search process final trend 
effects were non-existent when the sequence was common (MDown = 69, MUp = 71.29) but 
larger when the sequence was unique (MDown = 63.75, MUp = 73.89). See figure 16. 
FIGURE 16 
Study 4: Analysis of retrospective evaluations, less time on second stage 
Figure 16: Mean overall evaluation of focal browsing experience in study 4 as a function 
of type of retrospective evaluation, experience frequency, and experienced final trend. 
104 
 
The left hand panel depicts retrospective judgments of average quality, and the right hand 
panel depicts overall evaluations of search satisfaction. “Down” refers to the declining 
final trend condition, and “Up” refers to the improving final trend condition. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. These values only include participants who spent 
less than the median time on the second stage of the study. 
 
 
 
When participants spent more time on the second stage of the study final trend 
differences were not moderated by evaluation type or experience frequency. Instead, final 
trend differences were large across conditions (see figure 17). Other ways of splitting the 
data reveal similar patterns.  
 
FIGURE 17 
Study 4: Analysis of retrospective evaluations, more time on second stage 
Figure 17: Mean overall evaluation of focal browsing experience in study 4 as a function 
of type of retrospective evaluation, experience frequency, and experienced final trend. 
The left hand panel depicts retrospective judgments of average quality, and the right hand 
panel depicts overall evaluations of search satisfaction. “Down” refers to the declining 
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final trend condition, and “Up” refers to the improving final trend condition. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. These values only include participants who spent 
more than the median time on the second stage of the study. 
 
 
Discussion 
Study 4 demonstrates prior experience’s differing effects on informational versus hedonic 
evaluations of experiences. I argue that this interaction stems from different memory 
mechanisms involved in each case. For informational evaluations, additional experience 
helps consumers learn attribute values and rehearse the focal sequence, resulting in 
consumers recalling more about the information presented during common experiences. 
In this study, participants who viewed subsequent jogging stroller sequences had more 
exposure to the range of attribute values, which would provide a more informed frame by 
which to evaluate the focal episode’s attributes. On the other hand, for affective 
evaluations, additional experience resulted in memory interference, which prevented 
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participants from uniquely accessing their on-line affect from the focal sequence. Though 
interference likely figured even in recall for informational attributes, this effect was off-
set by the enhanced learning of these attributes. Notably, additional experience did not 
aid in learning of on-line affect, consistent with the argument that affect is a global 
response that can be recalled without a domain-specific cognitive structure. 
 
In this study the interaction between experience frequency and type of evaluation on 
overall evaluations was further moderated by the amount of time participants spent in the 
second stage of the study. Although not anticipated a priori, I argue that this measure of 
time spent serves as a proxy for how carefully participants formed immediate evaluations 
of the focal and subsequent sequences. For participants who were asked to pay attention 
to average quality levels, effortful processing would result in greater rehearsal of the 
focal sequence’s average quality levels as well as greater encoding of the subsequent 
sequences. As such, recall for average quality of the focal sequence would likely be very 
accurate, reflecting experienced trends. For participants who were asked to pay attention 
to their experienced affect, effortful processing would result in participants forming 
spontaneous impressions of search satisfaction. Thus, these participants’ memories were 
neither enhanced nor diminished by novelty, because there was a ceiling effect on how 
accurate their memories could be. It is difficult to explain the pattern of results by 
variables confounded with time spent on the second stage, such as enjoyment in the 
study, need for cognition, etc. While manipulating degree of effort would be a useful 
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extension, results based on measured effort captures people’s own tendencies to form 
immediate impressions. 
 
This study also generalizes the investigation to a different domain, manipulation of 
experienced affect, and manipulation of novelty. This study replicates past findings in the 
marketing literature, revealing that snapshot model effects are also relevant for 
consumers’ browsing experiences (e.g., Diehl and Zauberman 2005). Experienced affect 
was manipulated through the final trend of the focal sequence, whereas studies 1 and 2 
manipulated one moment of the focal episode (i.e., start and end), and in study 3 
experienced affect was measured. Finally, this study manipulates novelty through 
subsequent exposure to similar experiences. As such, the initial sequence was similarly 
involving and intense for all participants, but at the time of a delayed overall evaluation 
the experience had become more common for some participants. This methodology 
addresses the limitations of previous manipulations of novelty (i.e., measuring novelty or 
manipulating prior experience).  
 
Like study 3, this study focuses on frequency of experience as a dimension of novelty. 
The domain of experience—browsing for jogging strollers—was perceived as novel for 
participants in this study. Thus, the range of accumulated experience examined in this 
study was from unique to common, and not from novel to conventional. Nonetheless, it is 
informative that within this range of accumulated experience participants were able to 
quickly develop a cognitive structure that aided their later recall of average quality levels. 
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Even if participants formed an enduring affective representation of their search 
satisfaction through additional experience in the domain, it would contribute very little to 
enhancing memory for affect. Participants who lacked such a representation would still 
be able to recall their experienced affect, conditional on accessing the focal browsing 
sequence. 
 
XII. Study 5: Aesthetics study 
Study 5 distinguishes novelty from unfamiliarity and tests hypothesis 4, the prediction 
that prior indirect experiences will reduce accuracy of retrospective evaluations of affect 
for conventional but not novel experiences. Consumers not only engage in direct 
experiences in a domain, but also they are exposed to these experiences through indirect 
sources. For instance, consumers may describe experiences verbally to each other, or 
advertisements may simulate experiences prior to their occurrence. How do these indirect 
experiences—which factor into familiarity—impact the accessibility of direct experiences 
in the domain? Research on web-based search behavior indicates that consumers develop 
false memories of product capabilities when they interact with on-line, virtual product 
demonstrations (Schlosser 2006). While such exposure to information can simulate real 
experiences in conventional domains, they may not lead to the same effects in novel 
domains, where it is less likely that people will invoke an experience through 
contemplation alone.  
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In this study, on-line affect from an aesthetic experience was measured, and participants 
formed an overall evaluation of affect after a delay. The focal experience was either of a 
conventional or novel type. This focal experience was preceded either by a direct or 
indirect experience in the same domain. I predict that for novel experiences direct 
experiences will diminish accessibility more than indirect experiences. In contrast, 
indirect as well as direct experiences will equally diminish accessibility for conventional 
experiences. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants (n=119), undergraduate and graduate 
students at a large East Coast University, completed this study as part of an experimental 
lab session for which they were paid $10. The study followed a 2 (conventional, novel 
image domain) X 2 (description-based, image-based decoy experience) between-subjects 
design. 
 
Selection of Images. All images included in the focal study were pre-tested for 
their perceived enjoyment and novelty as separate factors. Pre-test participants (n=234) 
did not take part in the focal study and were asked to rate thirty images or thirty 
descriptions of images in a 2 (conventional, novel set) X 2 (ratings of descriptions, 
ratings of images) between-subjects design. Conventional images were all nature 
photographs, including pictures of wild animals and landscapes. Novel images were all 
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surreal paintings or photography, including bizarre artwork in the surrealism style and 
photographs by Atta Kim, who specializes in long exposure photos (e.g., Kim captures 
Times Square in New York by opening a lens for several hours. The resulting photograph 
depicts movement that occurs through the day). From this pre-tested set, images and 
descriptions were selected for the focal study to ensure that perceived novelty differed by 
novelty condition and liking for viewed images would be similar by novelty condition. A 
target set of eight images with similar mean enjoyment ratings (MConventional= 8.85, MNovel 
= 8.14) and a decoy set of seven images with similar mean enjoyment ratings 
(MConventional= 9.29, MNovel = 8.65) were selected. However, because the pre-test included 
other images in the rating task, the average liking of these images may not equate with 
on-line enjoyment in the focal study, which involved a smaller set of images and a 
different procedure. Instead, on-line affect was measured in the focal study itself. 
 
Focal study procedure. The focal study involved a 2 (conventional, novel image 
set) X 2 (description-based, image-based decoy experience) between-subjects design. The 
study took place within one lab session and proceeded in three stages: (1) a decoy 
aesthetic experience, (2) target image viewing experience, and (3) delayed evaluations. 
Each stage is described separately. 
 
 Stage 1: Decoy aesthetic experience 
Participants were exposed to a decoy aesthetic experience at the beginning of the 
lab session, which varied by condition. The decoy experiences were always in the same 
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domain as the target images (i.e., nature images or surreal paintings and photographs), 
and thus varied as either conventional or novel. Additionally, the decoy experience either 
involved reading seven descriptions of images or involved viewing the seven images as a 
between-subjects manipulation of decoy experience format. See figure 18 for examples of 
images and descriptions of images viewed in the decoy experience. 
FIGURE 18 
Figure 18: Examples of images and description of images viewed in the decoy task of 
study 5. 
 Conventional Novel 
Image 
Description A grown horse, white with brown 
markings, is followed along the fields 
by a young horse (foal), brown with 
white markings. Both horses are 
trotting at a steady pace in the 
direction of sunlight, which is to the 
viewer's right. The background is a 
grassy field, but little of it is shown as 
the frame of the image is determined 
by the size of the adult horse. 
 
This photo shows an unusual yellow 
melting substance with drops falling 
down and flying off the top. The 
substance spans the entire horizontal 
dimension of the photograph and is disc-
shaped. The drops fly at different angles 
from the disk shape, and they are more 
prominent towards the right of the 
image. The photo is based off of an 24-
hour exposure of ice melting. The photo 
lens is left open for 24 hours capturing 
the gradual melting of the ice. 
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Participants who only read descriptions of decoy images were exposed to each 
description for 30 seconds, after which they could move on to the next description at their 
own pace. These participants were instructed as follows: “Your task will be to visualize 
the image in your mind as much as possible and to focus on your enjoyment of the image. 
Each description will be displayed for 30 seconds, which will allow you sufficient time to 
visualize the image. After the 30 seconds have concluded, you will be asked to form a 
final image in your mind and to move on to the next description.” Participants who only 
viewed decoy images were exposed to each image for 5 seconds, after which they could 
move on to the next image at their own pace. These participants were instructed: “As you 
view each image, focus on your enjoyment of the image. Each image will be displayed 
for 5 seconds. After the 5 seconds have concluded, you will be asked to move on to the 
next image.” After reading all seven descriptions or viewing all seven images, 
participants were asked to think about their enjoyment of the experience. Thus, although 
participants thought about their enjoyment of the sequence during its course and after it 
concluded, they neither explicitly provided on-line evaluations nor provided a 
retrospective overall evaluation.  
 
Stage 2: Target image viewing experience 
All participants then saw a target set of eight images. These images were in the 
same domain as the decoy set, and thus varied as either conventional or novel. While 
viewing each image, participants were asked to provide their on-line enjoyment rating. 
Specifically, they were asked, “How much do you enjoy looking at this image?” which 
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they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 15 (“Very much.”). Participants 
controlled the pace at which they viewed each image. Conventional images were viewed 
for a similar length of time as novel images (MConventional = 3.89 seconds, MNovel = 4.34 
seconds; t(119)=1.40, p=.21). Two examples of target images are provided in figure 19. 
 
FIGURE 19 
Figure 19: Examples of images viewed in the target image viewing task of study 5. 
Conventional Novel 
 
 
 
Stage 3: Delayed evaluations 
After completing the target image viewing experience, participants moved on to 
other, unrelated tasks in the lab. After this delay (M=26.45 minutes) participants were 
prompted to recall the target image viewing experience. Participants who had only read 
descriptions of images in the decoy aesthetic experience were simply asked to recall the 
eight images they viewed. Participants who had viewed a decoy set of images prior to the 
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target image viewing experience were asked to recall the second set of images. To 
minimize confusion, these participants were reminded that only the images from the 
second set were rated on-line. All participants were then asked, “Considering these 
images, overall how much did you enjoy looking at these images?” They responded on an 
unmarked scale by moving a probe to a position on a line anchored by “Not at all” to 
“Very much.” The probe’s singular position on the scale was translated to a number from 
0 to 100, with higher numbers indicating more overall enjoyment. 
 
Participants were also asked to respond to further questions for manipulation checks and 
controls. There were three ratings for overall novelty of the target image set. First, 
participants were asked how often they had seen images like the ones they viewed, which 
they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Never”) to 7 (“Very often”). Second, they were 
asked how similar the images were to those they are exposed to in different media: They 
were asked, “You are regularly exposed to all kinds of images in many different media, 
such as television, film, magazine articles, advertisements, posters, art work, the Internet, 
etc. How similar were the images in this study to those you are exposed to regularly?” 
They responded to this second question on a scale from 1 (“Very Dissimilar”) to 7 (“Very 
Similar”). Third, they were asked how knowledgeable they were about the subject matter 
depicted in the images, which they responded to on a scale from 1 (“Not at all 
knowledgeable”) to 7 (“Very knowledgeable”). After these overall novelty questions, 
participants rated each image on how novel it was to them. They were presented each 
image one-by-one and responded to each image on a scale from 1 (“Not at all novel”) to 
115 
 
15 (“Very novel”). Finally, participants rated the extent to which the decoy descriptions 
or decoy images were similar to the target images in content and style; they responded to 
this question on a scale from 1 (“Not at all similar”) to 10 (“Very similar”).  
 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Novelty ratings for the nature images were much lower than these ratings for the surreal 
paintings and photographs, as revealed by between-subjects differences in the three 
manipulation check questions on novelty of the entire set (all t(119)>4, all p<.0001). 
Further, the sum of image-by-image novelty ratings were lower for the nature images 
than the surreal images (t(119)=7.51, p<.0001). 
 
On-line and Overall Evaluations 
Analyzing the mean of on-line image ratings revealed no main effect of decoy experience 
format (F(1, 117)< 1), a main effect of novelty (F(1, 117)=7.08, p=.009), and no 
interaction between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 117)< 1). Mean of on-line 
enjoyment ratings were higher for the conventional, nature images (M=9.28) than for the 
novel, surreal images (M=8.37). Similar results were obtained for the peak and end of on-
line enjoyment ratings: In each case no main effect of decoy experience format and no 
interaction between prior experience and novelty were obtained on these gestalt 
characteristics (all F(1, 117)< 3, all p>.10), but there was a significant main effect of 
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novelty in each case (both F(1, 117)>6, both p<.01). Peak of on-line enjoyment was 
higher for the conventional, nature images (M=13.51) than for the novel, surreal images 
(M=12.39). The final image was also enjoyed more on-line in the conventional condition 
(M=10.68) than in the novel condition (M=9.31). Consistent with these on-line 
differences, the same effects held for delayed overall evaluations. For overall evaluations, 
there was no main effect of decoy experience format (F(1, 117)<1), and no interaction 
between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 117)=2.73, p=.10), but a significant 
main effect of novelty (F(1, 117)=5.81, p=.02). Overall evaluations were higher in the 
conventional condition (M=64.86) than in the novel condition (M=55.52). Together these 
results suggest that the novel experience was associated with less enjoyment.  
 
Memory-Experience Gaps 
The main outcome of this study was not how novelty impacted enjoyment of the 
experience but rather how novelty impacted the extent to which delayed overall 
evaluations reflected on-line affect. In study 3, I examined the influence of gestalt 
characteristics of the experience on overall evaluations, finding that peak intensity and 
other aspects were more influential on overall evaluations if the experience was unique 
versus if it was common. That approach, isolating gestalt characteristics in the analysis, 
could not be applied to study 5. In study 5 each characteristic was confounded with an 
individual image, which varied by novelty condition. For instance, if the end of the 
sequence was more influential on overall evaluations for the novel versus conventional 
sequence, it could not be resolved whether this result stems from greater accessibility of 
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novel images or greater accessibility of the specific image viewed at the end of each 
sequence. As such, in study 5 I compared average on-line ratings of enjoyment with 
delayed overall evaluations of enjoyment. On-line evaluations, which were on a 15-point 
scale, were translated into the same scale for overall evaluations, which were on a 100-
point scale. The difference between overall evaluations and mean on-line evaluations 
served as the memory-experience gap (see also Miron-Shatz, Stone, and Kahneman 2009 
for a similar approach). This measure captures participants’ accuracy in recalling their 
on-line affect.  
 
In one analysis of memory-experience gaps, I examined actual differences between on-
line and overall evaluations of enjoyment, which measures directional bias in recall for 
experienced affect. However, this measure had a major limitation: Positive and negative 
differences canceled each other out, resulting in very small effect sizes. Indeed, the mean 
value of the memory experience gap (M=1.18) was not significantly different from zero 
(t(121)=0.77, p=.43). Further, analyzing this measure revealed no main effect of decoy 
experience format (F(1, 117)=1.82, p=.18), no main effect of novelty (F(1, 117)=0.71, 
p=.40), and no interaction between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 117)=1.16, 
p=.20), see figure 20. In the novel condition the pattern of means suggests that reading 
decoy descriptions earlier resulted in the target image viewing experience being 
perceived as more positive in retrospect, whereas viewing decoy images earlier pulled 
down retrospective evaluations. However, these directional biases are very small and may 
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stem from differences in general error in recall of affect rather than differences in 
directional bias. 
FIGURE 20 
Study 5: Mean Memory-Experience gap 
Figure 20: Mean memory-experience gaps in study 5 as a function of decoy experience 
format and novelty of the sequence. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
In an alternative analysis, I studied the absolute value of differences between overall 
evaluations and on-line ratings of enjoyment. This absolute difference captures the extent 
to which delayed overall evaluations departed from on-line evaluations—a measure of 
how well participants were able to access the target experience. This measure revealed no 
main effect of decoy experience format and no main effect of novelty (both F(1, 117)<1), 
but a significant interaction between decoy experience format and novelty (F(1, 
117)=7.37, p=.008), see figure 21. In the conventional image condition, absolute memory 
experience gaps were higher when provided a sequence of image descriptions beforehand 
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(M=14.94) and lower when provided a sequence of other conventional images prior to 
the target image set (M=9.25; t(54)=2.30, p=.026). On the other hand, in the novel image 
condition, absolute memory experience gaps were lower when provided a sequence of 
image descriptions beforehand (M=11.81) than when provided a sequence of other novel 
images prior to the target image set (M=16.03; t(63)=1.6, p=.11). The interaction held 
even when controlling for how similar the decoy images and descriptions were to the 
images in the target set (F(1, 116)=7.22, p=.008).  
FIGURE 21 
Study 5: Mean Absolute Memory-Experience gap 
Figure 21: Mean absolute memory-experience gaps in study 5 as a function of decoy 
experience format and novelty of the sequence. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study examined how direct and indirect experiences in a domain impact the 
accessibility of experiences in retrospective evaluations. The results revealed some 
effects that were expected and one that was unexpected. For novel experiences, direct 
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experiences were more influential than indirect experiences in diminishing accessibility, 
as revealed by higher absolute memory-experience gaps when participants were exposed 
to a decoy image viewing experience. However, for conventional experiences, having 
been exposed to a decoy description experience did interfere with memory for 
experienced affect, as demonstrated by a high absolute memory-experience gap in this 
condition. This finding helps to distinguish novelty from unfamiliarity: Whereas indirect 
experiences in a domain figure into familiarity, they are less influential in novelty. 
Indirect experiences increase interference only if an experience is conventional, and not if 
the experience is novel. 
 
An unexpected result occurred in the conventional experience condition: Participants who 
viewed a decoy set of images prior to the target set were actually more accurate in their 
recall for affect than participants in any other condition. The absence of a neutral 
condition, in which no prior experience of any type would be provided, was a limitation 
in the study’s design. The neutral condition would help to resolve whether the absolute-
memory experience gap was reduced through direct experience in the conventional 
domain or widened through indirect experience in this domain. Since the experimental 
manipulations do not lend an explanation, I can only conjecture as to why the earlier 
experience enhanced recall for affect. One possibility is that the earlier direct experience 
in the domain increased involvement in the target experience. Another possibility is that 
participants had enduring affective representations towards nature images. Recent 
exposure to a set of nature images cued these knowledge structures, which aided their 
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learning of affect for the target experience. These possibilities are intriguing, but they 
would require a different design to tease apart. Aside from a neutral condition, the study 
could involve a manipulation of timing of evaluation (immediate versus after a delay) to 
examine if encoding versus retrieval contribute to the phenomenon.  
 
Another limitation in this study was differences in affective intensity across conditions. 
In this study, participants enjoyed the conventional, nature image sequence more than the 
novel, surreal paintings and photographs. Prior research suggests that novelty could 
reduce enjoyment because novel experiences are experienced less fluently. Alternatively, 
this main effect could be a result of the particular stimuli selected. Although this main 
effect was not the focus of the analysis, it is still important to ensure more similar liking 
of the target images to equalize involvement in the experience. Moreover, decoy 
descriptions can be closely calibrated so that they cover the same content. These 
possibilities must be addressed in future studies. 
 
XIII. Conclusion and General discussion 
A. Summary of findings 
Consumers are constantly faced with decisions of whether to engage in experiences, 
including leisure activities, shopping visits, and service encounters. These decisions are 
often based on consumers’ overall evaluations of past experiences. As was noted at the 
outset of this dissertation, some of consumers’ past experiences are conventional and 
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others are novel. In fact, as today’s marketplace grows more abundant and varied, 
consumers have many available experiences that they would perceive as novel. As such, 
it is all the more important to understand the role of novelty in overall evaluations of 
experiences, as was pursued in this dissertation. Through five studies I demonstrated the 
following results: 
 
Study 1: Supporting hypothesis 1, the beginning intensity of an experiences was 
more influential on overall evaluations if it was novel compared to if it was 
conventional. This study established the basic effect of novelty: Novelty led to 
enhanced accessibility and greater weighting in overall evaluations of affect. 
Study 2: Supporting hypothesis 2a, the end intensity of an experience influenced 
immediate evaluations regardless of its novelty, but end intensity influenced 
delayed evaluations only if the end was novel. This study established that novel 
aspects have a more enduring influence on overall evaluations of affect. 
Study 3: Supporting hypothesis 2b, delayed overall evaluations were more accurate, 
reflecting on-line affect, if the entire experience was unique versus if it was 
common. This study provided evidence for the interference mechanism.  
Study 4: Supporting hypothesis 3, prior experience led to enhanced memory for 
presented information. Participants had more accurate recall for average quality 
levels when the experience was common compared to when the experience was 
unique. This study revealed differences in overall evaluations of affect versus 
retrospective judgments of presented attributes. 
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Study 5: Supporting hypothesis 4, indirect exposure to experiential information 
interfered with overall evaluations of conventional but not novel experiences. 
This study distinguished novelty from unfamiliarity. 
 
These studies involved different stimulus domains: annoying sounds (studies 1 and 2), 
pleasant images (studies 3 and 5), and browsing sequences (study 4). Studies involved 
different forms of overall evaluations: overall evaluations of unpleasantness (studies 1 
and 2), enjoyment (studies 3 and 5), satisfaction (study 4), and quality of options (study 
4). They also varied in their manipulation of novelty, either by pre-testing stimuli for 
their perceived novelty and presenting different type of stimuli (studies 1, 2, and 5), or by 
providing different amounts of accumulated experience prior to a focal episode (study 3), 
or by providing different amounts of accumulated experience after a focal episode but 
prior to the delayed overall evaluation (study 4).  
 
B. Theoretical contributions to the snapshot model 
The present investigation provides a number of important theoretical contributions to 
research on overall evaluations of extended experiences. First, at a very basic level, this 
dissertation identifies novelty as a factor that enhances accessibility of experiences or 
aspects of experiences. Much of the past research on extended experiences has revealed 
how memorial factors influence overall evaluations. The present work augments this set 
of factors to include novelty—a property that depends not on the relative positioning and 
intensity within the episode, but instead on stimulus and conceptual differences. I show 
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that the effect of novelty on accessibility in overall evaluations is not always positive, and 
I examine moderators of novelty’s influence. The specific set of moderators (e.g., timing 
of evaluation, form of evaluation, complexity of affective experience) is peculiar to 
novelty and may not apply to other accessibility factors, such as serial positioning and 
intensity. As such, the study of novelty reveals effects that were not anticipated by 
previous research on overall evaluations. 
 
Second, identifying the role of novelty in overall evaluations is critical in understanding 
how evaluations of a given type of experience change with accumulated experience. 
Snapshot model heuristics often lead to biases, raising the question of whether bias is 
reduced through accumulated experience in a domain. For instance, people under-weight 
moderate intensity moments and duration of the episode, but they over-weight improving 
trends and other gestalt characteristics; these biases are at odds with rational models of 
decision-making. This dissertation demonstrates that bias is not eliminated through 
domain-relevant experience, but instead accumulated experience leads to additional bias 
in overall evaluations of affect. As an experience ceases to be novel, immediate overall 
evaluations are still based on the same heuristics, including heavy weighting of the peak 
and end intensity. Moreover, with the reduction of novelty, it is harder to access 
experiences for delayed overall evaluations, leading to greater error in these evaluations.   
 
Third, in a related vein, I also demonstrate how evaluations can change with the passage 
of time. The role of delay has received little attention in past work: Timing of evaluation 
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has only been manipulated as a between-subjects factor in one investigation on extended 
experiences (i.e., Montgomery and Unnava 2009). This dissertation provides further 
support for the argument that that when evaluations are only formed after a delay they 
differ from immediate evaluations, but when evaluations are repeated after a delay they 
are based on similar aspects of the experience as immediate evaluations (see also 
Novemsky and Ratner 2003; Pocheptsova and Novemsky 2008). This result highlights 
the importance of studying factors that lead to more spontaneous immediate construction 
of evaluations. One such factor is identified in this research: The more time people spend 
deliberating on experiences post-episode, the more likely delayed evaluations will 
resemble immediate evaluations.  
 
Fourth, this dissertation links the snapshot model research to other work on consumer 
learning. Excepting Zauberman et al. (2006), previous work on the snapshot model has 
only studied overall evaluations of affect, neglecting how attributes are learned in 
extended experiences. Whereas Zauberman et al. (2006) focused on how serial-
positioning effects (i.e., primacy vs. recency) differ for informational versus hedonic 
evaluations, I focus on how the effect of novelty differs by type of evaluation. I find that 
novelty enhances the accessibility of experienced affect but diminishes attribute learning. 
This result also adds to the broad literature that distinguishes judgments based on affect 
from judgments based on cognition. I argue that because affect is a global response at a 
higher-level of construal, prior experience provides little memorial advantage in learning 
126 
 
on-line affect. In contrast, because thoughts about attributes are based on a lower-level 
construal, prior experience is more beneficial in learning such information.  
 
C. Theoretical contributions to study of novelty 
This dissertation improves our understanding of novelty, a construct that has been the 
subject of past work in psychology as well as marketing. I modified existing definitions 
of novelty in the psychology and new product literature for the purpose of studying 
extended experiences. As such, I specified that novelty depends on prior, direct 
experiences in a domain. Moreover, I provided evidence of how past indirect experiences 
differ from direct experiences in their effect on overall evaluations. This finding 
distinguishes novelty from unfamiliarity. Finally, by revealing how novelty influences 
overall evaluations, I identify a set of effects that may be pertinent to other areas of 
consumer behavior.  
 
D. Managerial implications 
Using the knowledge gleamed from this research marketers may configure experiences 
according to their desired ends. For instance, this research serves as a caveat to previous 
findings in the snapshot model that emphasized the importance of peak and end intensity. 
Although the peak-end rule suggests that marketers should adjust experiences so that they 
have very positive peaks and ends, the present work suggests that marketers can also 
devote resources to improving novel aspects of experiences. When combined with more 
conventional offerings in a sequence, novel aspects will be more accessible and thus 
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more influential on overall evaluations. Further, novel aspects are more likely to endure 
in their influence, impacting delayed overall evaluations. 
 
Marketers may also alter the timing of overall evaluations. Knowing that their offered 
experiences are highly positive but conventional, marketers may wish to encourage 
immediate overall evaluations. For instance, marketers could ask consumers to deliberate 
on their experienced affect after the episode has concluded. If an experience is only 
evaluated after a delay, the focal episode may not be as accessible, resulting in 
evaluations regressing to the mean. When the experience is negative, such error may 
benefit marketers, suggesting that they should discourage immediate evaluations and 
ensure that negative aspects of the experience are not novel. 
 
Marketers should also understand the basis by which consumers form retrospective 
evaluations. If consumers are largely recalling their on-line affect when deciding whether 
to repeat an experience, novelty will aid in their ability to access the episode. On the 
other hand, if consumers are basing their decisions on the experience’s attributes, novel 
experiences will be more poorly remembered. Marketers may also configure experiences 
differently by segment of consumers. The results of this dissertation suggest that 
presenting highly positive attributes will be more useful when attempting to retain expert 
consumers, who have more established knowledge structures by which to recall this 
information. On the other hand, these experienced consumers would have difficulty 
accessing their on-line affect. The opposite strategy should apply to novice consumers: 
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These consumers would be less able to learn attributes but more able to uniquely access 
their affect derived from the focal episode.  
 
Finally, marketers may also develop strategies to maintain the novelty of their 
experiences. By offering an experience infrequently, marketers can ensure that the 
stimulus and conceptual characteristics of an experience are not repeated too regularly. 
On the other hand, marketers have less to worry about indirect exposure to experiences. 
Presenting verbal information about aesthetic experiences will likely have little impact on 
how novel a new experience will be. Instead, such indirect exposure might drum up 
interest in the new experience prior to trial. 
 
E. Future extensions 
Prior investigations on overall evaluations have concluded with calls for further research 
on extended experiences, including work on different experiential domains and 
methodologies. I second their encouragement for future research in this area, and 
included some extensions to the snapshot model in the earlier literature review section on 
unresolved issues. Rather than re-iterating these directions, I offer a few ideas which 
would be useful for understanding the phenomena emphasized in the present 
investigation.  
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Methodology  
One methodological consideration in research on overall evaluations is how to capture 
on-line affect. I employed three approaches: measuring on-line affect during a repeated 
presentation of the experience (study 1), manipulating on-line affect (studies 2, 4), and 
measuring on-line affect during the experience itself (studies 3, 5). The repeated 
presentation method from study 1 offers a new option for future studies. As I addressed in 
the discussion of study 1, there is a need for further work on how a repeated presentation 
of an affective experience differs from the actual experience. Such research will provide 
better guidelines on when this technique would be justified.  
 
Measuring on-line affect during the experience may have influenced the results of study 
3. Consistent with past work, study 3 demonstrated that the experience’s trend had little 
impact on overall evaluations, and this may have occurred because on-line affect was 
measured (Ariely and Zauberman 2000). However, the decision to directly measure on-
line affect was centered on the cohesiveness of the affective experience and how likely it 
would be to invoke momentary evaluations (see Ariely and Carmon 2000). Whereas 
studies 1 and 2 involved continuous experiences (annoying sounds), study 3 involved an 
experience with discrete elements (fractal images), which provided greater justification 
for on-line measurement. Nonetheless, further work is needed to help determine whether 
on-line measurement of affect is appropriate in a given context. In particular, there is 
limited literature on what evaluative thoughts are naturally evoked during extended 
experiences. 
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In this dissertation, I found that overall evaluations were not always spontaneously 
constructed. Spontaneous construction of evaluations is less relevant for a loose 
collection of stimuli, as were sequenced together in these studies. Future research may 
provide insight on when overall evaluations arise for different experiential contexts. 
Some factors that may influence whether people will spontaneously construct an overall 
evaluation include prevailing norms in the consumption domain, how coherent the 
affective experience is, and whether the overall evaluation is perceived to be a useful 
input for future decisions. Moreover, as I suggested in the discussion of study 2, future 
research could examine when delay-repeated evaluations would differ from immediate 
evaluations through different ways of measuring overall evaluations. 
 
The effect of delay on overall evaluations found in this dissertation raises the issue of 
how long of a delay is necessary to demonstrate differences in overall evaluations over 
time, driven by novelty. In studies 2, 4, and 5 approximately 30 minutes was a sufficient 
delay, whereas in study 3 only 5 minutes was necessary. Although different delay 
intervals were not tested in any one study, I believe that the effective delay interval will 
depend on the nature of the extended experience as well as the delay. For instance, the 
annoying sounds task was both longer and more intrusive than the fractal image viewing 
task. The former experience may have had more sensory information than the latter. As 
such, study 2 required a longer delay to show impaired memory for the experience. On 
the other hand, the fractal image viewing task from study 3 was followed by experiences 
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that would more directly interfere with retrieval of previously experienced affect: After 
participants viewed the fractals they engaged in other artistic experiences, including 
listening to a classical music piece and reading poems. This richer delay interval may 
have accelerated memory interference in study 3. Further research assigning different 
delays—both in time and in kind—in the same study may provide a more precise 
understanding of the time course of novelty’s effect on overall evaluations.  
 
Measuring novelty may be more nuanced in future research. I asked participants for 
general measures of novelty, but future researchers may be interested in the perceived 
novelty of specific features of affective experiences. For more complex experiences, 
including experiences of mixed valence or mixed sensory modality, novelty may have 
differential impact on overall evaluations depending on which characteristics are 
perceived to be novel. This greater complexity may require future research on novelty to 
have more comprehensive pre-tests of stimuli. 
 
Diagnosticity  
One facet of the snapshot model not examined in the studies was the role of diagnosticity 
in evaluations. The results are more parsimoniously explained by accessibility rather than 
diagnosticity. For instance, that evaluations change over time within a study session 
cannot be explained by novel aspects being more or less diagnostic for overall 
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evaluations. Nonetheless, I can offer some conjectures on why novel aspects may be 
perceived as more diagnostic for overall evaluations in other contexts. 
 
One way in which novel aspects may be more diagnostic for overall evaluations is when 
experiences are pursued for their novelty. If the motivation for engaging in an experience 
is to try something new, consumers may focus on novel aspects, which are connected to 
their goals. Alternatively, novel aspects may be more diagnostic due to conversational 
norms. According to Gricean maxims, the pragmatics of natural language require people 
to be informative and relevant (Grice 1957). When asked to evaluate an experience in 
retrospect, considering novel aspects may be particularly informative to others, who may 
be inquiring about experiences for vicarious learning or curiosity. As such, if overall 
evaluations will be used to communicate value to others, as occurs with word-of-mouth 
recommendations, conversational norms may aggravate the extent to which overall 
evaluations depend on novel aspects. Future research can examine how overall 
evaluations differ when they are communicated to others versus when they are used for 
one’s own purposes. 
 
A different way of approaching diagnosticity is by examining how diagnostic overall 
evaluations are to decisions, and whether the impact of overall evaluations on decisions 
depends on the novelty of the experience. For instance, when deciding whether to repeat 
a conventional experience, consumers may rely on their perception of the entire category 
of experiences rather than their evaluation for a particular episode. In contrast, in novel 
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domains, which have fewer past episodes and more unstable category perceptions, 
consumers may rely on their overall evaluation for a recent past episode. Novelty may 
also be regarded as an orthogonal evaluative dimension for decisions. In research on 
aesthetic judgments, novelty is a valued trait which concerns the amount of perceived 
innovativeness (Cho and Schwarz 2006; Hart and Jacoby 1973; Hekkert, Sneiders, and 
van Wieringen 2003). Consumers may balance their goal of maximizing utility (i.e., by 
engaging in experiences with superior overall evaluations) with their goal of experiencing 
novelty. Thus, the novelty of an experience can mitigate the impact of overall evaluations 
on decisions. 
 
Informational and hedonic evaluations  
Further differences between informational and hedonic evaluations of experiences can 
also be tested in future research. In study 4, evaluation type was manipulated through 
different prompts. In an alternative test, participants’ goals can be manipulated so that 
decisions are based either on presented attributes or on-line affect. For instance, when 
making decisions in specified contexts, consumers may be more likely to form 
evaluations based on presented attributes. In cases where consumers seek to maximize 
enjoyment, retrospective evaluations may be based purely on past on-line affect. Future 
research could also examine if consumers weight affect or presented attributes differently 
in decisions depending on the novelty of the experience. 
 
134 
 
Another promising line of research would examine when prior experience aids in learning 
of experienced affect. In this dissertation, I found that a small accumulation of experience 
in a domain did not aid in learning of experienced affect (i.e., for the browsing 
experiences in study 4), but substantial differences in accumulated experiences may have 
resulted in differential learning of experienced affect (i.e., for the image viewing 
experience in study 5). This result may stem from changes in the role of prior experience 
across the continuum of accumulated experience. As such, future studies may investigate 
the extent of affective learning at different points in the continuum. Alternatively, the 
result could arise from differences in experiential domains. For instance, though search 
satisfaction is a relatively simple characteristic to recall, enjoyment of a sequence of 
aesthetic images is more complex and may require more deliberation. In the latter case, 
an enduring affective representation may have real benefits on how affective experience 
is accessed. 
 
Evaluations of singular experiences 
This dissertation examines experiences that extend over time or comprise sequences of 
outcomes. Will the same effects hold for evaluations of singular experiences, such as a 
taste of a jelly bean (e.g., Novemsky and Ratner 2003) or assessments of an object, such 
as a really new product (e.g., Alexander et al. 2008; Hoeffler 2003; Moreau et al. 2001)? 
One phenomenon of interest in this dissertation is the role of novelty in how aspects are 
weighted in overall evaluations. For the experiences studied in this work, aspects are 
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parts of an extended interval or one outcome in a sequence of outcomes. For singular 
experiences or objects, an aspect could be one feature of the experience (e.g., texture for 
a jelly bean) or object (e.g., attribute of a new product). Novelty may similarly impact the 
accessibility of these features. While evidence from this dissertation indicates that people 
also find novel aspects diagnostic to overall evaluations of extended experiences, more 
work will be needed to study if novel features are perceived as diagnostic for evaluations 
of singular experiences or objects. Another phenomenon studied in the present 
investigation is the role of novelty in accuracy of recalling past experiences. These 
findings are promising in their generalization to singular experiences and objects. The 
supported theories do not require experiences to extend over time in order find 
interference with other experiences or learning of attributes and affect. Thus, these effects 
may be generalizable to singular cases. 
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